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PRIVATE CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS: SOME TAX
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
By FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM t
As a part of the planning for post war federal taxation, Congress
and the Treasury have been investigating the whole field of tax exempt
organizations.: Prominent among the organizations enjoying exemp-
tion under the Internal Revenue Code are charitable organizations
created in the form of a trust, a non-profit corporation or other form
by a wealthy individual or family and controlled by the creator or
creators, their families or appointees. Such organizations fall within
the more general terms "foundation" or "charitable foundation," terms
which, for convenience, will be used to describe these organizations.2
t B.S.L., 1943, LL.B., 1944, University of Washington; Graduate Fellow, Yale
Law School, 1947-48; Assistant Professor of Law, Western Reserve University School
of Law.
1. See Hearings on Proposed Revisions of the Interiml Revenue Code, Part 5,
Tax Exempt Organizations other than Cooperatives, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947-8).
President Truman in his recent special tax message to Congress, while recommending
continued exemption of "educational and charitable organizations," also asked for
legislation to prevent these organizations from obtaining "competitive" and "other
unintended advantages." Cleveland Press, January 23, 1950, p. 6. col. 3, 4. The
Treasury has made specific proposals for legislation in this regard. Statement by
Secretary Snyder before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representa-
tives, February 3, 1950. CCH STANDARD FED. TAx REP. No. 9, Part 1 (February 8,
1950). See also statement of Mr. Randolph Paul, tax adviser to the Secretary of the
Treasury, in Hearings on the Revenue Revision Act of 1942, H.R., 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942), vol. 1, p. 80. Staffs in both the Treasury Department and the Joint
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation are preparing reports on tax exempt organi-
zations. See further, Investigation of Closing of Nashua, N.H., Mills and Operations
of Textron, Iw., SEN. REP. No. 101, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
2. The term "foundation" has been used to describe a large variety of organiza-
tions carrying on a number of different activities, some far from charitable in pur-
pose. In a more restrictive sense, a "foundation" has been described as a non-profit,
non-governmental organization having a principal fund of its own, established to aid
or maintain activities serving the common good. HARUPsON AND ANDREWS, AMiM-
cAN FOUNDATioNS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE 11 (1946). "Within this broad definition fall
community trusts, foundations in colleges, industrial foundations, associations and
agencies, gifts for highly restricted purposes, unincorporated charitable trusts, and the
so-called family foundations." Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for Avoid-
ance of Taxes, 34 VA. L. REV. 182, 193 (1948). The present paper is restricted to a
consideration of the "family foundation."
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Although the present interest in charitable foundations has cen-
tered on their tax-avoidance possibilities, they are not a new phenome-
non in our society. The charitable trust has long been a part of the
English and American tradition of favoring distribution of wealth
by individual volition.' Their social and economic implications have
been the subject of debate in the past.' There is no accurate knowl-
edge today of the number of foundations in the United States, al-
though lists of the wealthier ones run into the thousands.5 They repre-
sent a vast accumulation of wealth; 6 they distribute annually large
sums of money for scientific research, education, social welfare, and
similar interests.7 The inevitable result is that foundations wield a
powerful influence on our present culture.8
3. McDoUGAL AND HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING
AND DEVELOPmENT 246 et seq. (1948) ; Scott, Control of Property by the Dead, 65 U.
or PA. L. REv. 527 (1916).
4. HOBHousE, THE DEAD HAND (1880); HOLLIs, PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS
AND HIGHER EDUCATION 15 (1938); Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for
Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L. Rv. 182, 183 (1948).
5. Eduard Lindeman compiled a list of 533 private foundations and 40 com-
munity foundations for the decade ending in 1930. LINDEMAN, WEALTH AND CUL.TURE
10 (1936). The latest Russell Sage directory lists 505 foundations with assets of over
$50,000 from a total list of over 5,000. HARRISON AND ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 2;
see also, How to Have Your Own Foundation, 36 Fortune 108 (1947). The report
that the Treasury estimates more than 10,000 foundations in the United States is not
authentic according to Treasury officials. Some idea of the tremendous number of
charitable trusts and corporations in the United States can be gathered from a report
on the subject of charitable trusts contained in Reports and Recommendations for
Legislation of Former Attorney General Bushnell, 30 MASS. L.Q. 22, 24 (1945). The
report states that a survey made by the Massachusetts' Attorney General's department
in 1935 lists to that date in Massachusetts, 26,451 estates in which bequests had been
made for charitable purposes. The use of funds was restricted in 14,428 of the be-
quests, whereas the use was unrestricted in 36,500. The figures do not give the num-
ber of charitable trusts having trustees independent of an established charitable insti-
tution.
6. HARRISON AND ANDREWS, op. cit. mspra note 2, at 56 et seq., estimate the total
assets of 505 leading foundations with assets of over $50,000 to be $1,817,817,299. The
difficulty of arriving at an exact figure is illustrated by the fact that the above authors
selected the 505 foundations from a list of more than 5,000. Id. at 213. Of the 505
foundations, full reports were available for only 265 and the information on 15 of these
was confidential. Estimates on 69 foundations were based upon newspaper reports,
capitalization of expenditures and private information. No substantial information
could be obtained from 171 of the foundations. The authors therefore arbitrarily
capitalized each of these at $100,000. The same authors estimate the total wealth of
private foundations to be about 15 per cent of the total "philanthropic endowment"
which includes all educational institutions, hospitals, libraries, museums, religious or-
ganizations, and similar institutions.
7. HARRISON AND ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 54, 55, estimate private foun-
dations made grants totalling $72,000,000 for 1941. This figure represents approxi-
mately 3 per cent of the total charitable giving for the year from individuals, corpora-
tions, charitable bequests, and income from endowment other than private foundations
which total is estimated at $2,706,000,000. JOHN PRICE JoNEs, THE YEARBOOK oF
PHILANTHROPY (1942-1943) estimates total foundation grants to be $46,952,000 for
1942.
8. In his study of 100 foundations and community trusts during the decade 1921-
1930, Eduard C. Lindeman listed foundations as sixth in a list of major influences in
American life during that decade. The full list is: (1) business; (2) the press; (3)
educational institutions; (4) religious institutions; (5) governmental agencies; (6)
foundations; (7) sports and amusements; (8) secret societies; (9) literature; (10)
the fine arts. LINDEMAN, WEALTH AND CULTURE 11 (1936).
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Undoubtedly the foundation creators of the early 1900s were
little prompted by considerations of avoiding the minor tax burdens
of that day. One provocative writer has described foundations as
symptomatic of a later and disintegrating period in our economic de-
velopment,9 and of the rise of a rudimentary social consciousness on
the part of the very wealthy.' 0 Others have ascribed to donors motives
of a loftier nature. Whatever the motive or impetus prior to the
federal income, estate and gift taxes, since those enactments, avoidance
of tax burdens has become a stimulus of increasingly greater impor-
tance. The generous charitable deductions and exemptions of the
federal tax statutes have afforded points of special relaxation of pres-
sure in an area of general tax pressure. As a result, a larger number
of wealthy and moderately wealthy individuals are establishing foun-
dations in recent years."
Of course, the creation of a charitable foundation is not the sole
way of realizing the tax advantages of a charitable gift. Any chari-
table gift or bequest takes property out of the highest estate or income
tax brackets. 12  The sale of a business to any charitable organization
may mean for the seller a quicker realization of a higher sales price.' 3
The tremendous advantage of the charitable foundation is that the
creator and his family may realize charitable deductions by gifts to
the foundation and still retain control of the property given away.'4
Likewise, a business can be sold to the foundation on better terms than
a private buyer can offer, and yet the seller or his family can continue
to operate the business at reasonable salaries by controlling the foun-
dation.
9. Id. at 4, 5.
10. Compare the statement of Andrew Carnegie that the millionaire should be
"a trustee and agent for his poorer brethren, bringing to their service his superior
wisdom, experience, and ability to administer, doing for them better than they could or
would do for themselves." CARNEGiE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH (1900).
11. See note 4 supra, especially Note, The Use of Charitable Foundations for
Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L. Rrv. 183 (1948).
12. See GOLDTHORPE, HIGHER EDUCATION, PHILANTHROPY AND FEDERAL TAX
ExmmrToxs (American Council on Education Studies, Series 5, No. 7, 1944) ; Harriss,
Philanthropy and Federal Tax Exemption, 47 J. OF POLIT. EcoN. 526 (1939).
13. Because its income is tax exempt, the charitable organization is in a much
better position to pay for the business from earnings. A striking example was given
by Mr. John Gerdes, testifying for New York University before the Committee on
Ways and Means. Alumni and friends of the Unversity have formed several non-
profit corporations which have purchased commercial enterprises. The income of the
corporation is payable solely to the University. One of these corporations purchased
for $3,000,000 a plant in St. Louis manufacturing piston rings. The plant's profit in
two years before state and local taxes was $1,800,000. See Hearings on Proposed
Revisions of the Internal Revenue Code, note 1 supra, at 3539.
14. The charitable foundation also allows the creator to give more tax free in-
come to charity than the 15 per cent limitation of § 23(o) would otherwise allow. For
a summary of books and literature on the tax advantages of charitable giving, see
Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 183 (1947) ; see also LASSER, How TAx LAWS MAKE GIVING To
CHARITY EASY (1948).
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This paper undertakes a survey of the present limitations placed
by the Internal Revenue Code upon the creation and operation of
foundations. An analysis will be made of the forms of organization
required, of who may control the organization, of what may be its
sources of income, and of who may be the recipients of its income.
In conclusion a summary of suggested reforms will be made as a
basis for further investigation and discussion of the problem.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Although it is not difficult to comply technically with the Code
to assure a ciaritable deduction and exemption, still there are some
unaccountable divergences in the wording of various Code sections.
In a general way the sections are similar to Section 23(o), which al-
lows citizens and residents a deduction of up to 15 per cent of their ad-
justed gross incomes for contributions to: "
(2) a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund or foun-
dation, created or organized in the United States or in any posses-
sion thereof or under the law of the United States or of any State
or Territory or of any possession of the United States, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, liter-
ary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no
substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propa-
ganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation; .
The Congressional design of promoting charitable contributions
and organizations is carried forth in Sections 812(d) and
1004 (a) (2) (B) allowing an unlimited charitable deduction in com-
puting estate and gift taxes: Section 162 (a) permitting trusts and
estates an unlimited charitable deduction for gross income used, paid
or permanently set aside for charitable purposes, and Section 101(6)
granting charitable organizations exemption from income taxes. Sec-
tions 213(c), 861 (a) (3), and 1004(b) (2) allow income, estate and
gift tax charitable deductions to non-resident aliens. 6
The most pronounced lack of harmony in the Code sections exists
in regard to whether the foundation must be organized in the United
15. Section 23(o) also permits the deduction of gifts to the United States, the
District of Columbia, a territory, state, or political subdivision thereof, the veterans'
vocational rehabilitation fund, posts or organizations of war veterans, fraternal socie-
ties for limited uses, and special contributions to the United Nations.
16. Other income tax deductions include: Sections 120 (unlimited deductions for
gifts exceeding 90 per cent of net income) ; 23(q), 102(d) (1) (B) (corporations);
183 (c) (partnerships) ; 232(c) (foreign corporations) ; 336(a) (2) (foreign personal
holding companies) ; 505 (a) (2) (personal holding companies). Foundations are also
exempt from social security tax, §§ 1426(b) (8), 1607(c) (8).
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States or its territories. Congress, in the 1938 and 1939 Acts,
amended Section 23(o) to limit the deduction to gifts to charitable
corporations or trusts "created or organized in the United States." 17
The amendment was presumably made on the theory that only domes-
tic charitable organizations relieve the government of burdens it might
otherwise have to bear."' But the new section did not require that the
organization dispense its funds solely within the United States. Fur-
thermore, insofar as citizens or residents are concerned, neither the
gift nor estate tax sections permitting charitable deductions restrict
donations to domestically organized charities.19 Nor does Section
101(6) exempt only organizations created in the United States. In
the case of non-resident aliens the income, estate and gift sections ex-
empt only contributions to charitable corporations created or organized
domestically, but the gift and estate tax sections make no such re-
quirement for charitable trusts, although they do require the gifts or
bequests to be used within the United States by the trustees. 2' These
are the only sections, except for the section governing corporate chari-
table gifts,21 that require the funds of the organization to be used in
the United States.22
FORM AND MANNER OF ORGANIZATION
The taxpayer is given a fairly broad scope in choosing the form
which his foundation may take. The commonest forms of charitable
organization, the trust and the corporation, are exempt under all the
17. Revenue Act of 1938, §23(o) (2); Revenue Act of 1939, §224(a).
18. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19, 20 (1939) ; SEw. REP. No.
648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
19. Sections 812(d), 1004(a) (2) (B). Section 162(a) does not make such a lim-
itation on the charitable deductions of trusts and estates. Emily St. A. Tait, 11 T.C.
No. 89 (1948). The taxpayer's appeal on another issue has been remanded pursuant
to stipulation of the parties. 5 P-H 1949 FED. TAX SE:v. 71,107 (1949).
20. Sections 213(c), 861(a) (3), 1004(b) (2).
21. See § 23 (q).
22. Compare U.S. Treas. Reg. 111 § 29.23(o)-1 (1944): "A contribution or gift
to an organization described in Section 23(o) is deductible even though some portion
of the funds of such organization is or may be used in foreign countries for charitable
and educational purposes." Some support for the regulation is found in H.R. RFP.
No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19, 20 (1939), although the wording of the statute
seems clearly to the contrary. For a general summary of the sections see Lynch, The
"Charities" Provisions of the I, ternal Revenue Code, 10 FoRa. L. REv. 234 (1941).
The proposed Revenue Revision Bill does much to clarify the problem by making the
income, estate and gift tax sections uniform and requiring foundations to be organized
domestically. Funds of the foundation must be used in this country only if they are
gifts from non-resident aliens. Revenue Revision Bill of 1948, §§ 113", 115, 207, 254.
No amendment was made to § 162(a), however. The bill was introduced in the 80th
Congress as H.R. 6712, and was passed by the House but was not finally enacted by
Congress. The bill was introduced in the 81st Congress as H.R. 990, 95 Cong. Rec. 97
(Jan. 6, 1949) but no action has been taken on it. 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAX REP.
10,001 (1949).
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pertinent code sections. 8 Presumably any type of "association" is also
exempt.2 4 The corporate form of organization seems generally pre-
ferred by practitioners over the trust form probably because it is the
type of organization in which flexibility and close control are easier to
attain.25
The bequest or gift to the charitable foundation must come in-
disputably from the decedent or donor to be deductible.2" This does
not mean, of course, that a testator cannot provide for the bequest and
direct his executors to organize a qualifying charitable corporation.27
But there are definite advantages in the inter-vivos creation of the
charitable organization. The donor will have a definite ruling con-
cerning the exempt status of the organization, thereby assuring the
deductibility of the later bequest."8 There is the obvious advantage
23. Section 101(6) specifically exempts only "corporations and any community
chest, fund or foundation." But the phrase has been interpreted to include private
charitable trusts. Fifty-Third Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 767 (6th
Cir. 1932); accord, G.C.M. 15778, XIV-2 CuM. BULL. 118 (1935). Section 162(a)
permits trusts and estates an unlimited charitable deduction in any event for gifts
made pursuant to the deed or will.
24. Section 3797(a) (3) defines the term "corporation" as including the term
"association." See also U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §§81.44, 81.54 which refer to "cor-
porations and associations"; Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1930).
25. See CHAMBERS, CHARTERS OF PHILANTHROPIES (1948); Note, The Use of
Charitable Organizations for Avoidance of Taxes, 34 VA. L. REv. 182, 194 (1948) ;
Ross, A Primer os Charitable Foundations and the Estate Tax, 27 TAXES 116, 117
(1949); Blackwell, The Charitable Corporation and the Charitable Trust, 24 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1 (1938).
26. Estate Tax: Dimock v. Corwin, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), aff'd sub nom.
Jacobs v. United States, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 72 F.2d 197 (8th Cir.), cert. detied, 293 U.S. 604 (1934) ; First Trust Co.
of St. Paul v. Reynolds, 137 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1943) ; Commissioner v. First National
Bank of Atlanta, 102 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1939). Gift Tax: Martha F. Mason, 46
B.T.A. 682 (1942). The decedent or donor cannot bequeath or give a sum to a
private individual and leave the making of the gift to the individual's discretion.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, supra; Burdick v. Commissioner, 117
F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1941). Under the estate tax, however, the fact that another person
has the power to divert a charitable bequest made in the will to private purposes
will not destroy the charitable deduction if the holder of the power to divert makes
a timely disclaimer. Sections 812(d) and 861 (a) (3) as amended by § 408(a), (b),
Revenue Act of 1942. A private bequest is also deductible under this amendment if
the legatee promptly disclaims the bequest and it falls into a bequest to charity. See
Commissioner v. McCauley, 150 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1945). The gift tax does not con-
tain such provisions. See Martha F. Mason, supra.
27. Commissioner v. Citizens Southern National Bank, 147 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.
1945); Potter v. Bowers, 89 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1937); William T. Bruckner, 20
B.T.A. 419 (1930); Compare Fremont C. Peck, 34 B.T.A. 402 (1936), appeal dis-
missed without opinion, 2d Cir. Nov. 18, 1937, P-H FED. TAX CTATOR 1567 (1943),
where the ultimate existence of the organization was in doubt. Presumably the
charitable trust would be created in the decedent's will. In the Potter and Bruckner
cases, supra, the estate or trust holding the assets of a charitable corporation until it
could begin operating was held entitled to a deduction under § 162(a) for income
earned and set aside for the corporation.
28. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.101-2 (1943) requires every organization claim-
ing an exemption under Section 101 to establish its right to an exempt status by filing
a prescribed form and other data with the appropriate collector. The documents are
forwarded to the commissioner for final determination. Cf. E.T. 3, XII-2 Cum. BuL.
279 (1933) disallowing an estate tax deduction because of the form of corporation
provided for in the will.
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of shifting income producing property to the foundation and thus
minimizing the donor's income tax liability, as well as providing a
convenient and controllable source for deductible gifts under Section
23 (o). The Clifford-Horst doctrine discussed under the next heading
and the estate tax marital deduction are factors which limit the ad-
vantage of the inter-vivos creation of a foundation.29  Under the
marital deduction provisions charitable bequests are not deductible in
determining the "adjusted gross estate." SO Therefore the taxpayer's
gross estate will be allowed a larger marital deduction if he waits until
death to make his charitable contributions, or if his inter-vivos gift will
be includible in his gross estate.31
MEMBERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
At the present time neither the statutes, regulations, cases, nor
administrative rulings place any direct restrictions on the membership
and management of the charitable organization. The Treasury has
ruled that exemption of an educational institution should not be denied
on the sole ground that it was controlled by one family.
3 2
The charitable organization is obviously entitled to pay salaries
as a part of administrative expense since the code sections prohibit
only "net earnings" from inuring to private individuals.33 The cases
have upheld the payment of reasonable salaries to the creator of the
foundation and his family for services rendered to the family controlled
organization. 4 The "reasonableness" of salaries is, of course, a ques-
tion of fact. The exemption has been denied where the payment of
salaries was in reality a guise for distributing net income to private
29. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) ; Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112
(1940). The estate tax marital deduction is found in § 812(e).
30. See §§ 812(e) (1) (H) ; 812(e) (2) (A).
31. For example, if the taxpayer owns property valued at $1,000,000 and makes
an inter vivos gift of $500,000, his estate will be allowed a marital deduction of only
$250,000. If he provides for the $500,000 charitable gift in his will, his estate will
be entitled to a marital deduction of $500,000 (presupposing no § 812(b) deductions).
Inter vivos gifts made in contemplation of death or through a controlled trust may
throw the gift or trust corpus into the gross estate and thereby enlarge the marital
deduction.
32. I.T. 3220, 1938-2 Cum. BuLL. 164, modifying I.T. 2933, XIV-2 Cum. BULL.
117 (1935). There was no showing that the salaries were unreasonable, that a
reserve account was retained from which sums might later be paid as salaries, or
that family control of a business rather than an educational purpose was the primary
purpose of the organization. The ruling stated that any group in control might
effectively distribute income to themselves, whether they are members of a family
or not.
33. Forest Lawn Memorial Park Association, Inc., 45 B.T.A. 1091 (1941); Sand
Springs Home, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927).
34. Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926); Miss Harris' Florida
School, Inc., P-H 1940 B.T.A. ME~m. DEc. 1140,275 (1940); Home Oil Mill v. Willing-
ham, 68 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ala. 1945), accord for another t r year, 5 CCH 1949 FED.
TAX REP. 19257 (N.D. Ala. 1949), Govermnent appeal allowed, 5 CCH 1950 FED.
TAX REP. 11,860 (1950).
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individuals, most of whom were members of the family controlling the
corporation. 35
If the creator or his family are to be trustees or officers of the
foundation, the organization must withstand such limitations as the
Clifford-Horst doctrine establishes. 36  Although the limits of the doc-
trine are uncertain, retention of sufficient control over the organiza-
tion's principal fund or income by the creator or members of his family
may mean that the income of the organization will be taxed to the
creator, or perhaps to family members. Thus far litigation and regula-
tions concerning the doctrine have centered about controlled trusts
rather than closely held corporations. It is easier to predict, therefore,
the taxable status of a charitable trust under the doctrine, than that of
a charitable corporation.
There have not been a great number of controlled charitable trust
cases. None have been decided since the adoption of the Clifford
Regulations."' In the first decision on the problem, the Second Cir-
cuit held the grantor not taxable for the income of a five year trust,3 8
where the trustees were entirely independent and the grantor retained
no control over trust property. Subsequent decisions involving con-
trolled trusts and charitable beneficiaries have varied as the whole
developing case law interpreting the Clifford doctrine has varied. The
Second Circuit was more doubtful of its decision for the grantor in
Commissioner v. Chamberlin.39 There the trust was for four years
and the grantor and another were trustees with broad administrative
powers. The court emphasized that the trust was not an inter-family
distribution of income as in Clifford and Horst.40  But where the trust
35. Northern Illinois College of Optometry, P-H 1943 TC MEM. DEC. Smv.
143,396 (1943). In this case during the tax years in question approximately 65 per
cent of the gross income of an otherwise qualified educational institution was paid
out in salaries and well over one-half of the total salaries went to members of the
controlling family group. See RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS, §376(b) (1935) and com-
pare Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas, 25 F. Supp. 511 (Colo. 1938),
affirmed, 106 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 623 (1939).
36. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940).
37. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21 (1945).
38. Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1940).
39. 121 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1941).
40. The court declined to tax the transferor on the broad definition of receipt of
benefits established in Helvering v. Horst, where Justice Stone stated that the grantor's"right to receive income, to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained only by the
expenditure of money or property, would seem to be the enjoyment of the income
whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods at the corner grocery, the payment
of his debt there, or such non-material satisfactions as may result from the payment
of a campaign or community chest contribution, or gift to his favorite son." 311 U.S.
112, 117 (1940). The Chamberlin opinion could not interpret Horst to mean that
"every settlor of a trust is taxable upon whatever part of its income is applied to
purposes the furtherance of which gives him some satisfaction," 121 F.2d 765, 766
(2d Cir. 1941). For similar judicial comment on Horst, see Kohnstamm v. Pedrick,
153 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1945) ; see also Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942) ; Miller,
Gifts of Income and Property: What the Horst Case Decides, 5 TAx L. REv. 1 (1949).
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was merely for a one year period and the grantor could substitute other
securities for those in the trust corpus, the court did not doubt that
the grantor was taxable under the Clifford or Horst cases. 41  The
Sixth Circuit applied similar reasoning to invalidate a five year chari-
table trust with broad powers reserved by the grantor.42
In Helvering v. Bok, 43 however, the Third Circuit failed to tax
the grantor on trust income where the term was for three years and
all administrative powers and control of distributing income was lodged
in three independent trustees, two of whom were the grantor's sons. A
nine year trust was also upheld by the Eighth Circuit (one judge dis-
senting) wherein the grantor's husband was trustee, and the grantor
reserved power to alter the trust to carry out more fully its charitable
purpose, to approve investments by the trustee, and to appoint a new
trustee who could be the grantor.
4
The Clifford regulations have extended case law in the matter of
some retained powers. 45  But they have also made it clear that other
powers are not important in determining the grantor's liability or are
only important to a limited extent. Under the regulation if the grantor
has a reversionary interest, the trust term must extend in any event
for at least a ten year period.4 The regulations permit the grantor,
however, to reserve the power to determine the beneficial enjoyment
of corpus or income "if such corpus or income . . . is irrevocably
payable for the purposes and in the manner specified in § 23
(o)." 47 The grantor may also escape income taxation and yet reserve,
41. Commissioner v. Lamont, 127 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1942). The trust was not
exclusively a charitable trust because the trustee had power to distribute income
among charitable institutions and distant relatives. The court emphasized that in fact
the trustee complied with the grantor's wishes in exercising this power. Compare
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-21(d). The court also had doubts as to the present
validity of its Achelis and Chamberlin decisions in view of the Horst case and Har-
rison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
42. United States v. Anderson, 132 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S.
790 (1943).
43. 132 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'g 46 B.T.A. 678. The trustees had sole
discretion to distribute income among charitable beneficiaries including private indi-
viduals.
44. United States v. Pierce, 137 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1943).
45. The Clifford Regulations are accepted for the purposes of this article as
a correct interpretation of §22(a). The Third Circuit has recently approved and
retroactively applied portions of the Regulation, Kay v. Commissioner, - F.2d -
(3d Cir., Jan. 10, 1950). For a debate over their validity as administrative inter-
pretations, see Pavenstedt, The Treasury Legislates: The Distortion of the Clifford
Rile, 2 TAx L. REv. 7 (1946) ; Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly
City of Legislative Intention, 2 TAx L. Rxv. 327 (1947) ; Pavenstedt, A Reply to, Mr.
Eisenstein, id. 476; Pavenstedt, Supplemental Reply to Mr. Eisenstein, id. 569; Eisen-
stein, A Postscript, id. 578.
46. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-21(c), and see note 48 infra.
47. Id. § 29.22(a)-21(d) (2). Cf. Commissioner v. Lamont, sitpra note 41; Helver-
ing v. Bok, supra note 43. This provision is a limitation on the broad definition of
charitable beneficiaries in § 162(a). Presumably if trust beneficiaries are other than
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in a fiduciary capacity, the power to vote stock held by the trust, to
direct investments, and to substitute -property of an equivalent value
for trust property.48 Certain other administrative powers may not be
retained by the grantor in any capacity no matter what the duration of
the trust.4" The regulations define these powers as "administrative
control . . . exercisable primarily for the benefit of the grantor.
S. ." The condemned powers include those giving the grantor or
anyone without a substantial adverse interest, or both, authority to
purchase or sell trust corpus for less than an adequate consideration,
or to borrow trust property withotit adequate security or interest.
Thus the major limitations under the Clifford regulations are the
minimum ten year period for the trust which will revert to the grantor,
and the proscription against the retention by the grantor, or another
without an adverse interest, of certain administrative controls in any
capacity and their retention of others in a non-fiduciary capacity.
If the Clifford-Horst doctrine is applicable to controlled charitable
trusts holding securities no reason is apparent why the doctrine is not
applicable to creator-controlled charitable corporations the sole func-
tion of which is to hold title to securities. Holding companies of this
type fit easily within the language in Higgins v. Smith," stating reasons
for disregarding the solely-owned corporate entity.8 In that case the
taxpayer was denied the right to deduct a loss arising from his sale of
securities to his wholly-owned corporation. The Second Circuit used
the rationale of Higgins v. Smith to attribute the income of the solely
owned corporation to Smith, who admitted tax avoidance to be the
primary, if not the only, reason for maintaining the corporation.
2 If
the creator has sole and complete control of the holding company's
management and dissolution, it would seem that he would have a
difficult time escaping tax liability for the corporate income.
organizations defined in § 23(o), the grantor may still escape taxation and retain the
power to distribute income or corpus if his power is within the limited scope of
§ 29.22(a) -21(d) (4). He may also give the power to distribute income or corpus
to an independent trustee within the scope of § 29.22(a) -21(d) (3).
48. Under the Clifford Regulations § 29.22(a) -21(c) (1), (2) the grantor may re-
tain these powers without fear of taxation, even if he has a reversionary interest.
The trust term, however, must be for at least a ten year period if the charitable
beneficiaries are within the § 23(o) definition. Otherwise the term must be for a
minimum of fifteen years. But whatever the duration of the trust term, § 29.22 (a)-
21(e) (4) requires the grantor to hold these powers in a "fiduciary capacity."
49. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-21(e)(1), (2) (1947).
50. 308 U.S. 473 (1940). See also Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
51. Reed, J., said in part: "Title, we shall assume, passed to Innisfail [corpora-
tion] but the taxpayer retained the control. Through the corporate forms he might
manipulate as he chose the exercise of shareholder's rights in the various corporations,
issuers of the securities, and command the disposition of the securities themselves.
There is not enough of substance in such a sale finally to determine a loss." 308 U.S.
473, 476 (1940). "It is the command of income and its benefits which marks the real
owner of property." Id. at 478 (1940).
52. Commissioner v. Smith, 136 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1943).
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There is some authority for the position that the sole stockholder
would be better insulated from taxation if the charitable corporation is
created to operate a business rather than merely to hold title to secu-
rities. Thus far the courts have not passed squarely on the effect of
the Clifford-Horst doctrine on solely owned corporations operating a
business, although a recent Supreme Court case may be a step towards
application of the doctrine.53  There have been a great number of cases
in other contexts, however, considering business activity and the in-
violability of the separate entity of solely owned corporations. Anal-
ysis of the Supreme Court cases indicates that if the corporation was
created purely as a tax avoidance medium and performed no business
activities, the Commissioner may recognize or disregard the entity,
whichever produces more revenue.54 If the corporation carries on
business activities, however, after incorporation, the Supreme Court
has said that the sole stockholder may not disregard the corporate
entity for his tax advantage.55 When such business activity is present,
the Second Circuit has construed the Supreme Court decisions to mean
that the Commissioner may not disregard the corporate entity.56
Will the court's emphasis on business activity prevent the applica-
tion of the Clifford-Horst doctrine to charitable corporations? A
blanket rule prohibiting the application of the doctrine would be un-
justified. If the predominant use of the corporation by the sole stock-
53. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), reversing 161 F.2d 171 (8th
Cir. 1947), which had reversed 6 T.C. 431 (1946). See Note 57 YALE L.J. 308 (1947).
But see Carlton B. Overton v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 304 (1946), aff'd, 162 F.2d
155 (2d Cir. 1947); Commissioner v. Montgomery, 144 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944).
Compare Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) with United States v.
Cumberland Public Service Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 280 (1950).
54. Burnet v. Commonwealth Improvement Co., 287 U.S. 415 (1932) ; Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940). See also Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355
(1939) ; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
55. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Interstate
Transit Lines v. Commissioner 319 U S 590 (1943) ; National Carbide Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). Even though the court in these cases and in those
of the previous footnote speaks of an added requirement: that the corporation must
be created for a business, as opposed to a tax avoidance purpose, it is doubtful if
the creator's "purpose" must be a business one. The cases are all explainable on
the ground that the corporation did not engage in business activity; that it had no
"significant business effect." See Schlesinger, "Thin" Incorporations: Income Tax
Advantages and Pitfalls, 61 HARv. L. Rxv. 50, 63 (1947). A purpose to reduce taxes
does not invalidate a taxpayer's transaction or plan, although it may make the transac-
tion or plan suspect.
Lower courts have held that a sole stockholder may disregard the corporate
entity where the corporation merely holds title to property and was not created for
tax avoidance purposes. See United States v. Brager Building & Land Corp., 124
F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941) ; Henry T. Roberts, P-H 1948 TC MEm. DEc. 1 48,165.
56. National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944). See also
Commissioner v. Montgomery, 144 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944). For general recent
discussions of the corporate entity problem in tax cases see Cleary, The Corporate
Entity in Tax Cases, 1 TAx L. REv. 3 (1946) ; Case, Disregard of Corporate Entity
it Federal Taxation--The Modern Approach, 30 VA. L. Ryv. 398 (1944). For the
earlier cases and articles see Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax,
44 YALE L.J. 436 (1935).
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holder is to assign income while controlling the property producing the
income, it would appear that the corporate entity should be disre-
garded. 57  As a result, of course, the sole stockholder would be taxable
for the corporate income as earned. If business purpose or activity
necessitates holding the corporate entity inviolate the creator may be
taxed on an alternative theory. That is, because of his dominant posi-
tion the creator controls corporate income and any distribution of
income by the corporation, even though irrevocably payable to a
charity, should be taxed to him."8 Under this theory the corporation
would apparently be subject to the corporate income tax and the sole
stockholder would be taxable upon distribution of corporate income.5 9
Whether the creator is taxed under the first or second of the above
theories, or whether the corporation operates a business or merely holds
title to property, the vexing problem of how much control the sole
shareholder must retain remains to be determined. The Clifford
Regulations may be of some help in anticipating the Treasury's prob-
able position on what controls amount to "ownership" of the corpora-
tion. No matter what other powers the creator and dominant share-
holder may have, he may be taxable if the corporation's charter estab-
lishes a corporate existence of short duration.6" If no minimum time
limit is declared, then a charter provision that the assets must go to
charity upon dissolution would be a persuasive factor against taxing
the dominant shareholder. By analogy to the Clifford Regulations,
the fact that the creator may control the beneficial disposition of cor-
porate income would not alone create tax liability for him.6 The sole
shareholder, however, may have in substance many of the adminis-
57. See thA family partnership cases, Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946) ;
Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 69
Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949). The assignment of income rationale has been applied to hold
the husband taxable on the income of sole proprietorships where title to the busi-
ness was given to the wife but the husband had exclusive power to manage the busi-
ness. Robert E. Werner v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 39 (1946); R. W. Semmler, P-H
1948 TC MEm. DEc. 48,031, aff'd per cur., 173 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1949). Contra:
Henson v. Comm., 174 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1949), reversing 10 T.C. 491 (1948). Cf.
Armstrong, Shall We Have a Clifford Doctrine for Corporations? 26 TAXEs 830
(1948) ; Johnson, Taxing Dividends of Family Corporations-A Dissent, 2 TAx L.
REv. 566 (1947); Mannheimer, Income Tax Status of Gifts of Family Corporation
Stock, 25 TAXEs 604 (1947). The argument has been made that the corporate entity
cannot be ignored under the Clifford-Horst doctrine because Congress has attempted
to safeguard the reenue by enacting statutes to protect against the abuse of the cor-
porate device. See e.g., INT. REv. CoDE §§ 102, 115(g), 45, 24(b) (1) (B), 24(b) (1)
(C), 24(c), 500, 331. Because Congress has attempted in certain sections to prevent
tax avoidance through control of corporations would not seem to mean that the cor-
porate entity is immune from attack. A similar, and perhaps more forceful, argument
was made and rejected in regard to trusts in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331
(1940), and see Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
58. Compare Alexandre, The Corporate Counterpart of the Fandly Partnership,
2 TAx L. Rxv. 493 (1947).
59. Johnson, supra note 57.
60. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21 (c) (1947).
61. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-21(d) (2) (1947).
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trative powers condemned in the regulations.62 And it may be more
difficult for him to prove he holds the powers in a "fiduciary
capacity." '3
Where the charitable corporation operates a business there are
added considerations of sufficient control. If the creator and sole
shareholder actively manages the business and has the exclusive right
to control corporate assets, the analogy to the Tower case 6a would
seem complete and the creator therefore taxable (assuming that the
entity were disregarded). On the other hand, if the charitable institu-
tion which is declared in the charter to be the recipient of all income
distributed by the charitable corporation also holds all or a majority
of the stock and actively votes that stock, perhaps the "control" by
the charitable institution would be sufficient to save the creator from
any tax liability. 4 Or perhaps if a majority of voting power is given
to members of the creator's family, and they actually participate in
formulating corporate policies, the creator would not be taxed on the
theory that he is assigning income while controlling the property.
Control by the creator's family is not per se considered control by the
creator, 5 nor would the family members be taxable on corporate in-
come under present law.66
I A vigorous application of the Clifford-Horst doctrine to charitable
trusts and corporations would have some beneficial effect towards
eliminating family control of foundations. But once the short term
limitation is hurdled, the creator and his family have a pretty clear
field. The regulations prohibit only the more obvious administrative
controls. The grantor may still vote the stock and control invest-
ments in a "fiduciary capacity." He is presumed to be acting in such
capacity if he is a trustee, and even if he is not a trustee, it would
appear difficult to prove that he was not acting for the best interests
of the beneficiaries in voting or investing securities. Apparently mem-
bers of the grantor's family would be without a substantial adverse
interest, and, therefore, there would be no greater advantage in lodging
control in them during the grantor's lifetime. But after his death,
family control may be made much broader without fear of taxing
62. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-21(e) (1947).
63. The assets of a charitable corporation have been called "trust funds in its
hands," Jones v. American Home Finding Assoc., 191 Iowa 211, 182 N.W. 191 (1921) ;
Brattleboro Retreat v. Town of Brattleboro, 106 Vt. 228, 173 Ati. 209 (1934) ; Con-
gregational Sunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review, 290 Ill. 108,
125 N.E. 7 (1919). See also ZoLimAx, AmEnICAN LAW oF CnAsTis 332 (1924).
63a. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
64. See Commissioner v. Culbertson, 69 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1949).
65. Ibid. But cf. U.S. Treas. Regs. 111, §29.22(a)-21(c) (2), (d) (3) and (4)
(1949).
66. See infra notes 67 and 68.
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foundation income to members having control. The regulations pro-
vide 17 that a person other than the grantor will be taxable on trust
income only if he has power to revest corpus or income in himself, or
if he relinquishes those powers but retains powers which would make
the grantor taxable on trust income. The cases have gone no further
than the regulations, if as far."
If the charitable corporation operates a business, the creator may
be taxable unless he is willing to relinquish actual control or manage-
ment to members of his family, to the charitable institution, or to
others. At best, however, the assignment of income rationale is a
limited doctrine. Pushed to its utmost, it will probably never sub-
stantially limit family control of foundations.
SOURCES OF INCOME
A charitable organization may derive funds for its operation from
gifts, bequests, dues, tuition, the ownership of income producing prop-
erty, or the operation of a business enterprise. The increasing use of
the last of these sources by educational institutions has been a problem
of growing concern to Congress and the Treasury.69 And the fact
that an individual may also control a charitable organization makes
the prospect of selling his business to a controlled foundation in-
creasingly appealing to individual taxpayers.7"
Until recently the practice of the Bureau has been to grant exemp-
tion to organizations operating a business. 71 But within the last few
months the Commissioner has asserted a deficiency against a non-profit
67. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-22 (1949).
68. See Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871
(1945); Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
684 (1941) ; Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Annie I. Grant v.
Commissioner, 11 T.C. 178 (1948), affd, 174 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1949) ; W. C. Cartin-
hour v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 482 (1944), acq. Cum. Bu.. 5; Margaret Batts Tobin
v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 928 (1948).
69. See Hearings on Proposed Revisions of the Internal Revenue Code, Part 5,
Tax Exempt Organizations other than Cooperatives, Committee on Ways ad Means,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1947-8). The Treasury has recommended that income of chari-
table corporations and educational institutions derived from operating a business be
subject to the corporate income tax. Statement by Secretary Snyder before the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, February 3, 1950, CCH
STAND. FED. TAX REP., No. 9, Part 1 (February 8, 1950). Statement by Mr.
Randolph Paul, tax adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, 1 Hearings on the
Revenue Revision Act of 1942, Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
89 (1942). See also BLODGETT, TAXATION OF BUSINESSES CONDUCTED BY CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATIONS, N.Y.U. FouRTr ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 418
(1946). Note 34 V_ L. REv. 183 (1947). For a discussion of the "lease-back"
transactions wherein a tax exempt or tax favored organization purchases business
property from a business concern and thereupon leases the property back to the con-
cern, see Cary, Corporate Financing through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property:
Business Tax, and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1948).
70. Compare Ross, A Primer on Charitable Foundations and the Estate Tax, 27
TAXES 116 (1949).
71. BLODGE r, op. cit. supra, note 51.
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corporation operating a business for the benefit of a university. The
corporation has filed a petition for a redetermination of the deficiency
in the Tax Court.72 The ultimate decision of the case may mean that
charitable organizations defined as exempt under 101(6) will be de-
prived of this source of revenue.
The problem has never been squarely presented to the Supreme
Court, although an early decision bears on the problem and is often
cited.73 In that case a religious order incorporated under statutes of
the Philippine Islands obtained approximately 92 per cent of its in-
come from rentals of real property, ownership of corporate securities,
and interest on loans. Somewhat more than half of the remainder of
its income was derived from occasional sales of wine, chocolate and
other articles "purchased and supplied for use in its churches, missions,
parsonages, schools and other subordinate agencies." The order
claimed exemption from income taxation under Section II(G) (a) of
the 1913 Act, which corresponds substantially to Section 101 (6) of
the present code.74
The government argued that the order was not "operated exclu-
sively" for exempt purposes because of its commercial activities. In
answering this contention, Mr. Justice VanDevanter, speaking for the
court, gave the statute an extremely broad interpretation. Said he:
"Two matters apparent on the face of the statute go far towards set-
tling its meaning. First it recognizes that a corporation may be organ-
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or
educational purposes, and yet have a net income. Next, it says nothing
about the source of the income, but makes the destination the ultimate
72. C. F. Mueller Company v. Commissioner, T.C. Docket No. 21600 (1949).
See also Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, I CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. 9257 (N.D.
Ala. 1949), gover ment appeal allowed, 5 CCH 1950 FED. TAX REP. 1 11,860.
73. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, etc., 263 U.S. 578 (1924);
afflining 42 Phil. 397 (1921).
74. All of the income, estate and gift tax sections dealing with charitable exemp-
tions and deductions define exempt organizations as ". . . organized and operated ex-
clusively for religious [or] charitable . . . purposes . . .no part of the net earn-
ings of which inure to the benefit of any private stockholder oi individual. .. ."
Section 812(d) does not require trusts to be "organized and operated exclusively"
for exempt purposes, but does require the trustee to use the bequest "exclusively for
charitable . . . purposes." In Eagan v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1930),
a charitable bequest was made to a board of trzustees composed of employees of a cor-
poration. The court stated that the bequest was made to the trustees, not to the cor-
poration, therefore questions concerning organization and operations were not issues to
consider in determining if the bequest was deductible under § 812(d). See also
§ 861 (a) and PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, § 12.18 (Supp. 1946). Sec-
tions 23(o), 106(6), 1004(a)(2)(B) and 1004(b)(2), (3) do not contain this ap-
parent exception in regard to trusts. But cf. § 162(a). Thus the question of the
organization and operation of a business operated by trustees might not be a ground
for denying a deduction under the estate tax, but might still be the basis for denying
an exempt status under the income or gift tax sections. See Edward Orton, Jr.,
Ceramic Foundation, 9 T.C. 533 (1947), aff'd, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949). Section
207, Revenue Revision Bill, H.R. REP. 990, note 22, "upra, would amend §812(d)
and eliminate this apparent discrepancy in favor of trusts.
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test of exemption." 7' The last sentence has been the principal basis
in subsequent lower court decisions for upholding business activities
by charitable organizations. But the second sentence of the quotation
is apparently sufficient to justify the holding. The fact that a chari-
table organization may have a "net income" would cleary mean, as
the court noted, that it may own income producing property and make
"such property productive." 71 It is difficult from the reports to deter-
mine the nature of the sales of wine, chocolate and other articles. Ap-
parently the sales were made by churches, schools and other agencies
to worshippers, students, and others using the facilities maintained
by the order. The court stated that from the evidence these trans-
actions did "not amount to engaging in trade in any proper sense of the
term." Sales were not made to the public in general nor in competition
with other businesses. Any profits, furthermore, were negligible. The
decision is excellent authority for holding that a charitable organization
may own income producing property and retain its exempt status. It
is negligible authority, however, for interpreting the statute as exempt-
ing charitable organizations which operate ordinary commercial enter-
prises. The final sentence in the above quotation was not needed for
the decision. The usual liberal interpretation of the word "exclusive"
in the charitable deduction and exemption sections would have sufficed
to prohibit the selling transactions from destroying the corporation's
exempt status.7
In two early cases involving the issue of commercial activity, how-
ever, the Board determined to interpret the statute according to the
Supreme Court's broad dictum. The first opinion involved a religious
organization which operated, among other things, an inn, a farm and
sold publications. 71 In these and other commercial endeavors sales
were made to the general public although earnings from all commer-
cial activity were only a minor source of income. In the second case
the charitable corporation received all of its income from a variety of
business enterprises which it owned and operated under the sole man-
agement of its founder.79 In the first case the charitable corporation
used the income for charitable work in which it was engaged. This
was true of most of the income of the organization in the second case,
although a part of the income was distributed to other charitable in-
75. 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924).
76. The present regulations are in accord. U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.101(6)-i
(1943).
77. See text at note 104 infra.
78. Unity School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926), acq. VI-1 CuM. Buur. 6
(1927). The Supreme Court's opinion and subsequent lower court decisions are dis-
cussed in Finkelstein, Freedom From Uncertainty in Income Tax Exemptions, 48
MicH. L. REv. 449, 453 et seq. (1950).
79. Sand Springs Home, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927), acq. VI-1 Cum. BuuL. 5 (1927).
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stitutions. The essence of the Board's decisions is that the Commis-
sioner was not justified in denying exemption because of competitive,
commercial activity. The corporation is entitled to exemption if all
of its net income is used for exempt purposes, and "these purposes
* are the controlling reason for the corporation's existence.
,, s0 Although the opinions recognize the factual distinction in
regard to commercial activity between the Board cases and the
Supreme Court case, the distinction is treated as without consequence.
The Board's construction of the statute has been emphatically
reaffirmed by the federal district courts and courts of appeals. Com-
petitive commercial activity as a sole or substantial source of income
has not of itself been a factor denying exemption to a charitable cor-
poration."' Of these cases, the opinion of the Second Circuit in Roches
Beach, Inc., is of particular importance for two reasons. First, it
adopts the rule generally accepted by the courts, but not by the Com-
missioner, that the court may look to all the evidence and not merely
to the charter to see if the corporation is "organized" for charitable
purposes.s Second, the decision exemplifies a judicially approved
80. 4 B.T.A. 61, 69 (1926).
81. Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938), reversing
35 B.T.A. 1087 (1937) ; Bohemian Gymnastic Association Sokol v. Higgins, 147 F.2d
774 (2d Cir. 1945); Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Foundation, 9 T.C. 533 (1947), aff'd,
173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949); Home Oil Mill v. Willingham, 68 F. Supp. 525 (N.D.
Ala. 1945), accord for another tax year, 5 CCH 1949 FED. TAx REP. 119257 (N.D.
Ala. 1949), governtent appeal allowed, 5 CCH 1950 FED. TAx REP. 11,843; Linder-
man v. Driscoll, 26 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Pa. 1939) ; cf. Commissioner v. Battle Creek,
Inc., 126 F. 2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942). Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945) involved a similar interpretation of § 101(8):
"Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for
the promotion of social welfare. . . ." The courts have not applied such a liberal
construction to § 101(9) exempting "clubs organized and operated exclusively for
pleasure, recreation and other non-profitable purposes, no part of the net income of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder." Exemption has been denied
clubs engaging in a definite program of commercial activities involving transactions
with the general public. Jockey Club v. Helvering, 76 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1935) ; West
Side Tennis Club v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1940); National Mah Jongg
League, Inc. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Occasional, incidental
transactions do not destroy exemption. Santee Club v. White, 87 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.
1936); Koon Kreek KIub v. Thomas, 108 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1939); Scofield v.
Corpus Christi Golf & Country Club, 127 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1942), Anderson Country
Club, 2 T.C. 1238 (1943). See discussion of the problem in Bohemian Gymnastic
Association Sokol v. Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1945). The courts have simi-
larly construed § 101(7) exempting "Business leagues, chambers of commerce, real
estate boards, or boards of trade, not organized for profit . ." 6 MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 34.28 (1949).
82. The Board had held for the Commissioner on this point, but the Second
Circuit thought the approach too narrow. The fact that the corporation was in-
corporated under the New York general business corporation act, and that its charter
was silent as to charitable purposes was outweighed by the other evidence. Such
evidence, including the will of the creator of the corporation, showed his intent to
establish the corporation solely as a medium for operating a business and deriving
income for a charitable foundation to which he bequeathed all the corporation's stock.
For a time the Bureau accepted Roches Beach, Inc. as a precedent. G.C.M. 20853,
1938-2 Cum. BULL. 166; G.C.M. 21610, 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 103; G.C.M. 22116, 1940-2
Cum. BuLL. 100. The case was considered an exception to the Bureau's general rule
that the charter is controlling on the theory that it would be a perversion of the will
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method for creating a tax exempt entity to operate a business concern
for a controlling charitable institution, thereby avoiding the risk of
exposing the charitable institution's assets to the hazards of business
failure. The operating corporation was incorporated by Roche during
his lifetime with the intention that after his death the corporation would
manage his beach properties for the benefit of the charitable founda-
tion which he established in his will. He intended to, and did, control
the corporation and receive its income for the few months that he
lived after forming the corporation. 3 Upon his death he left the cor-
poration's stock to the trustees of the foundation. His intention that
the corporation's income should be devoted exclusively to the charitable
foundation was reiterated in his will.
A corporation so organized and operated was held to be within
Section 101 (6). Its exempt status was not denied by the fact that
the corporation merely produced income for another organization
which actually administered the charitable activities. The corpora-
tion must be "organized," however, for charitable purposes. It is not
exempt merely because all of its stock is owned by a charitable or-
ganization.
8 4
if corporate income was channeled to non-charitable sources. See O.D. 60, 1 Cumf.
BuLl. 193 (1919); O.D. 177, 1 Cum. BULL. 194 (1919); O.D. 190, 1 Cum. BuL..
194 (1919). But in G.C.M. 23063, 1942-1 Cum. BuLu. 103, the Bureau decided
that it would no longer follow the Roche's Beach decision and its former memoranda
were modified accordingly. The following cases are in accord with Roche's Beach, Inc.:
Debs Memorial Radio Fund, Inc. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1945);
Bohemian Gymnastic Association Sokol v. Higgins, 147 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1945);
Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1940); Anderson Country Club,
2 T.C. 1238 (1943); Journal of Accountancy, Inc., 16 B.T.A. 1260 (1929); Unity
School of Christianity, 4 B.T.A. 61 (1926). Cf. Round Table Club v. Fontenot, 143
F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1944); United States v. Proprietors of Social Law Library, 102
F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1939) ; Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Eaton, 20 F.2d 419 (D.
Conn. 1927) ; Bear Gulch Water Co. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1941).
83. The fact that he received the income from the corporation for the remainder
of his life was no more than mentioned by the court in detailing the facts. Such a
personal life interest in the income by the founder of a charitable corporation will
probably be a point of greater concern for future cases in determining whether the
corporation was "organized" for charitable purposes within the statutory definition.
84. Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan 73 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 294 U.S. 719
(1934); Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 160 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1947); Sand Springs
Railway Co., 21 B.T.A. 1291 (1931). The corporations in these cases were also
denied exemption under '§ 101 (14) as "corporations organized for the exclusive pur-
pose of holding title to property, collecting income therefrom, and turning over the
entire amount, less expenses, to an [exempt] organization. . . ." The corporations
were all organized for the operation of a business, said the courts, not for the narrow
activities outlined in § 101(14). See also Gagne v. Hanover Water Works Co., 92
F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1937).
Judge Learned Hand dissented in Roche's Beach, Inc. on the ground that § 101(14)
defined an exempt "feeder" corporation and thereby "as to all other subdivisions it
meant that a subsidiary should not be exempted merely because its parent was exempt."
96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938). If the sole ground for Judge Hand's dissent was
that the corporation should not be granted exemption merely because it was controlled
by an exempt organization, it would seem that he had overlooked the fact that the
operating corporation was organized for a charitable purpose. But if, as it appears,
his dissent is upon the more fundamental ground that the source of income, not its
use, is a controlling test in determining an exemption, he is decidedly in the minority.
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If the owner of a business is concerned about the impregnability
of the cases interpreting Section 101 (6), or if the cases are overruled,
he may be able to fulfill his plans by selling his business to a controlled
charitable trust. Section 162 (a) does not require that the trust be
"organized and operated exclusively" for charitable purposes. It
merely provides for a deduction of any or all of the gross income
which pursuant to the trust deed is "during the taxable year paid or
") 85permanently set aside for [charitable) purposes. . 8
This suggestion presupposes, of course, that the trust will not be
classified as an "association" within Section 3797(a) (3) and therefore
treated as a corporation for purposes of the Code.8" The cases have
broadly defined the term "association" so that a charitable trust oper-
ating a business may have a difficult time getting outside the definition.
The decisions have been summarized as requiring the participants to
associate together in a joint enterprise for the carrying on of a busi-
ness for profit in an organization substantially resembling a corpora-
tion. 7  A charitable beneficiary would undoubtedly be classified as
an "associate in a joint enterprise." Such "associates" are not re-
quired by the decisions to supply capital or to have a voice in manage-
ment. 8 And where the owner of a business transfers it to a charitable
trust, the trust will be operating a "business" and "for profit."
There are at least two methods whereby the trust may escape
identification as an association. One is to provide for a single bene-
ficiary. The other is to draft the trust deed so as to avoid as much
as possible any resemblance to the corporate form of organization.
The first technique is based on the statement in Morrissey v. Com-
missioner89 that "'Association' implies associates," and on the as-
sumption that associates must have a beneficial interest in the trust,
thereby eliminating the trustee. Thus, if the trust is limited to one
beneficiary there cannot be any "associates." The Ninth Circuit has
If a corporation limited to charitable purposes may be exempt and yet operate a
business, the fact that it dispenses charity itself or turns over its income to other
exempt organizations for their use should not be controlling. See 6 MERTENS op. cit.
supra note 81, § 34.15, n.29.
85. See note 73 siupra for a discussion of a similar interpretation of deductions
for charitable trusts under § 812(d).
86. Section 3797(a) : "When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly ex-
pressed or manifestly incompatible for the intent thereof . . . (3) The term 'corpora-
tion' includes associations, joint stock companies, and insurance companies."
87. 7A MFRTxs, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION § 43.10 (1943). The
leading cases defining "association" are the group decided by the Supreme Court
in 1935: Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344; Swanson v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 362; Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365; Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Asso-
ciates, 296 U.S. 369. See also A. A. Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 385
(1937).
88. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) ; Swanson v. Commissioner,
296 U.S. 362 (1935); Porter Property Trustees, Ltd., 42 B.T.A. 681 (1940), aff'd,
130 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1942).
89. 296 U.S. 344, 356 (1935).
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cast doubt on this theory by holding, although without citing any
Supreme Court cases, that a trust with one beneficiary may be an
association.9" If business trusts are to be taxed as corporations because
they are in essence operating as corporate organizations, it is not clear
why a distinction should be made between single-beneficiary trusts and
solely-owned corporations. Nor is it clear why an "associate" must
have a so-called beneficial interest when the trust instrument may give
a trustee much greater "benefits" through powers of control over
corpus.
The second method by which trusts may avoid classification as
corporations is based on the agreement by the courts and the regula-
tions '1 that an association must resemble a corporation to be taxed as
one. But neither the courts nor the regulations have specified an exact
formula for applying the corporate-resemblance test. In the Morrissey
case the court specified five salient features of a trust which may make
it analogous to a corporate organization. These have been summarized
as: title vested in a single entity, centralized management, continuity,
transferability of beneficial interests, and limitation of personal lia-
bility.92 The Supreme Court did not make it clear, however, which
or how many of these corporate attributes are required.
In a recent article surveying the problem, the author concludes
that two essential features of an association are continuity and central-
ized management.9" He also believes, although with less certainty,
90. Lombard Trustees v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1943). In that
case a trust operating a business had but one beneficiary during part of the taxable
year. The court held against the taxpayer's contention that the trust was not an
association during that period. The trust was thought to be analogous to a solely-
owned corporation. See also Titus v. United States, 150 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1945),
Ittleson v. Anderson, 67 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1923). Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144
(1924), implies that several trustees may be associates.
The arguments supporting the theory that associates must be beneficiaries are
marshalled in Smith, Associations Classified as Corporations Under the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 34 CAL. L. REv. 461, 470 et seq. (1946). The author finds support in lan-
guage in the Morrissey case, but he depends primarily on Lewis & Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 301 U.S. 385 (1937). He distinguishes Lombard Trustees on the ground that
the court did not consider the Lewis case, that the trust instrument contemplated more
than one beneficiary because it provided for certificates of beneficial interest, and that
the parties intended that other beneficiaries should be added. A similar argument
could probably distinguish the Ittleson and Titus cases. The Lewis case, however,
is far from being solid support for Mr. Smith's position. Instead the decision seems
to rest on the ground that a principal-agent relationship had been created with the
incidents of an ordinary trust added merely to facilitate the work of the agent and
protect the principal. The principal-agent relationship does not create an association,
said the court, because there is no analogy to the corporate form of organization.
The principal prescribes the agent's powers and generally can retract those powers at
any time. Perhaps in the Lewis case the principal could not terminate the agency
since the agent is said to be a beneficiary under the trust. But if the agent is also
a beneficiary then there were two beneficiaries under the trust and the argument
based on lack of associates due to one beneficiary seems to fall.
91. U.S. Treas. Regs. 111, §§3772-2, 3797-3 (1943).
92. Smith, supra note 90, at 470, 510.
93. Id. at 534.
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that transferability of beneficial interests is essential.94 Where the
grantor or his family or associates are to continue operating the busi-
ness there will be, in most cases, centralized management. Perhaps
if the trust deed prohibits the transferability of beneficial interests and
provides for termination of the trust upon the death of a trustee, or
contains either of these provisions, the trust will not be taxable as a
corporation.
DESTINATION OF FUNDS
To meet the requirements of the law of trusts a charitable trust
must devote its funds exclusively to "charitable" purposes.9 5 A
similar test is established by the Internal Revenue Code to determine
the exemption of a charitable organization. To gain an exempt status
a charitable organization must devote its funds exclusively to purposes
designated by the pertinent Code sections. They require generally that
the foundation be "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, including the
encouragement of art and the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals. . ." " Unless the creator of the foundation has in mind
a specific purpose which may not be clearly charitable, his draftsman
should have no difficulty in defining the organization's purposes so as
to bring it within these requirements. The charters or documents
establishing many foundations merely quote the words of the statute.
97
It is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a detailed analysis
of the terms used in the code sections. Basically these sections impart
the broad definition of the term "charitable" which has been developed
in connection with charitable trusts generally. The term includes the
relief of poverty, the promotion of health and the advancement of
religion, education, governmental purposes, and purposes beneficial
94. Mr. Smith frankly states that no case has considered this item as solely deter-
minative of the issue. Id. at 522-525. Cf. Porter Property Trustees, Ltd., 42 B.T.A.
681 (1940), aff'd, 130 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1942). Earlier commentators on the Mor-
rissey and related decisions were not impressed with the corporate-resemblance test,
or, apparently, with any test other than the business purpose of the trust. Lowndes,
The Tax Burden of the Supretie Court 1935 Term, 5 FORD L. Rav. 426, 441-42
(1936); Warren, The Redction of Inwome Taxes Through the Use of Trusts, 34
MicH. L. Iv. 809, 838 (1936).
95. 2 RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 398 (1935) ; Scott, Trusts For Charitable And
Benevolent Purposes, 58 HAtv. L. REV. 548 (1945).
96. The phrase "encouragement of Art" is used in § 812(d) only to define chari-
table corporations, but not charitable trusts, nor is the term found in §§23(o) and
(q), 162(a), or 101(6). The phrase is undoubtedly included, nevertheless, in the
broad definition of the word "charitable." Note, however, that only §§ 23(o), (q),
101(6), 1004(a) (2) (B), and 1004(b) (2) refer to veteran rehabilitation service and
posts or organizations of veterans. These activities, especially the latter, might not
be classified as "charitable" by the courts. But see 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 368
(1935), quoting from the Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 ELiz. c. 4.
97. See generally CHAMBERS, CHARTERS OF PHILANTHROPIES (1948).
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to the community." Such a broad definition of the term has led
inevitably to vagueness and to an inability in the opinions to distin-
guish "charitable" from the terms "religious," "scientific," "literary,"
and "educational." 9
In spite of the courts' liberal interpretation of the sections, some
limitations are observed. The activities of the foundation must be of
the specific types enumerated in the statute. Organizations promoting
fraternal, social, recreational, athletic or similar activities, despite their
benevolent purpose, are not within the statutory requirements. 00 No
substantial part of the activities of the organization may be "the carry-
ing on of propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legisla-
tion." ' And, although the limitation is not specifically stated in the
Code sections, the courts have followed the general holding in trust
cases 102 that the organization must be operated for a public, as con-
trasted with a private, purpose. 03
98. 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS 9§ 368-374 (1935); 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 348 et seq.
(1939). Definitions of charitable trusts frequently quoted in tax cases are found in
Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 556 (1867); Ould v. Washington Hos-
pital for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877) ; and see 2 PERmy, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 687 (7th ed. 1929). The following tax cases provide examples of the variety of
activities held to be "charitable": Estate of Carolyn E. Gray, 2 T.C. 97 (1943) (fund
to provide special nursing care for hospitalized graduate nurses) (estate tax) ; M. D.
Thatcher Estate Co., 38 B.T.A. 336 (1938) (corporation formed "for charitable, edu-
cational and civic and philanthropic uses . . .") (gift tax); George E. Turnure, 9
B.T.A. 871 (1927) (a community club whose object was "to draw into closer rela-
tionship members of the community and to promote their intellectual, moral, and
physical welfare") (income tax) ; Robert W. de Forest, 19 B.T.A. 595 (1930) (cor-
poration publishing magazines to promote philanthropy through education) (income
tax).
99. An analysis of the cases construing these terms is found in 1 PAUL, FEDERAL
ESTATE: AND GIFT TAXATION § 12.05 et seq. (1942, and Supp. 1946) ; 6 MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3421 et seq. (1948). See also Lynch, The "Charities"
Provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 10 FORD L. REv. 234 (1941).
100. 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 97, § 12.08.
101. This phrase was added to the income, estate and gift tax sections (except
§ 162(a)) in 1934, but it made no substantial change in the interpretation of the code
since organizations which had as a primary purpose the dissemination of propaganda
or the influencing of legislation had been held not to be "charitable" before the
amendment. Slee v. Comm., 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930); G.C.M. 19715, 1938-1 Cume.
BULL. 499. See also Girard Trust Co. v. Comm., 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1940) ; Hen-
riette T. Noyes, 31 B.T.A. 121 (1934) ; Sharpe's Estate v. Comm., 148 F2d 179 (3d
Cir. 1945). Trust law generally does not condemn a trust which is otherwise charitable
"if the accomplishment of its purposes involves a change in existing law." 3 ScoTT,
TRUSTS § 374.4 (1939). See criticism of this clause in the Code sections as an un-
warranted restriction on legitimate activities of social welfare organizations in Devine,
Pioneers or Propagandists?, 29 SuRvEy GRAPHIC 348 (1940).
102. Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362, 365 (1879) ; 2 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 375
(1935) ; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 375 et seq. (1939). Note also the limitation contained
in the code sections pertaining to charitable corporations which states that "no part
of the net earnings of [the corporation may inure] to the benefit of any private share-
holder or individual."
103. A foundation created primarily to aid fourteen grandnephews and grand-
nieces to obtain college educations, held neither a "charitable" nor "educational" trust
within §§ I004(a) (2) (B) and 101(6) of the code. Amy Hutchison Crellin, 46
B.T.A. 1152 (1942). See also Cap Andrew Tilles, 38 B.T.A. 545 (1938), aff'd, 113
F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 703 (1940) ; James Sprunt Benevolent
Trust, 20 B.T.A. 19 (1930); Henry C. DuBois, 31 B.T.A. 239 (1934); Estate of
Carolyn E. Gray, 2 T.C. 97 (1943).
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The requirement in the Code sections, that the foundation be
"organized and operated exclusively for religious" and other purposes,
is not, however, to be construed literally. "Exclusively" does not mean
"solely" according to the cases; closer synonyms are "primarily" or
"substantially." 104
To some extent a similar interpretation has been given to the
qualification, common to all pertinent sections, prohibiting a charitable
organization from distributing any "part of the net earnings . . to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." 105 This limita-
tion has been strictly adhered to when the charitable corporation has
private shareholders who are receiving dividends from net earnings, 106
or who have the right to dividends from earnings under the corporate
charter.107  The cases involving receipt of net income by non-share-
holders, however, have not construed it so strictly. Several decisions
have affirmed the exempt status of charitable foundations required by
their creator to pay private annuities out of income.
Perhaps the most extreme example is Edward Orton, Jr. Ceramic
Foundation.108 Decedent devised a plant manufacturing "pyrometric
cones" for use in the ceramics industry to a non-salaried board of
trustees. Under a plan outlined in the will the business was to be
operated by the trustees at a profit. Decedent, while a professor of
ceramic engineering at Ohio State University, had invented the process
and established a plant for manufacturing the cones. His will declared
that his primary purpose in making the devise was to continue the
manufacture and sale of cones "of the highest quality and most exact
accuracy commercially feasible, at a reasonable price." 10' The "second
and subsidiary purpose" 11 of the trust was to provide a research
organization for studies in ceramic arts. If the business became
104. See Girard Trust Co. v. Comm., 122 F.2d 108 (3d.Cir. 1941); Commis-
sioner v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 147 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1945); Mar-
shall v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Anderson Country Club, 2 T.C.
1238 (1943); Estate of Carolyn E. Gray, 2 T.C. 97 (1943) ; James Irvine, 46 B.T.A.
246 (1942); George E. Turnure, 9 B.T.A. 871 (1927); Chemists' Club v. United
States, 64 Ct. Cl. 157 (1927).
105. But see discussion of § 162(a) in note 127 infra.
106. Kemper Military School v. Crutchley, 274 Fed. 125 (W.D. Mo. 1921),
T.B.R. 33, 1 Cum. BuLl. 199 (1919); Journal of Accountancy, Inc., 16 B.T.A. 1260
(1929).
107. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 280 U. S. 591 (1929) ; Berkeley Hall School, Inc., 31 B.T.A. 1116 (1935),
aff'd, 84 F. 2d 539 (9th Cir. 1936). The remote possibility that members of non-profit
corporations forbidden to pay dividends might receive the assets upon dissolution has
not been held a sufficient ground for denying exemption. Goldsby King Memorial
Hospital, P-H 1944 MEM. TC DEc. ff 44, 233 (1944); Washington State Apple
Growers, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 64 (1942); Armin A. Schlesinger, 11 B.T.A. 601 (1928).
108. 9 T.C. 533 (1947), aff'd, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949).
109. 9 T.C. 533 (1947).
110. Ibid.
640 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
obsolete, the trustees were authorized to turn over the assets to Ohio
State University.
The will provided that decedent's debts should be paid out of the
other assets of the estate and the remainder should go to his wife.
She was also to receive under the will the sum of $42,000 payable over
a period of five years out of the "current earnings" of the business.
The wife received none of the remaining assets, however, since they
proved insufficient to pay decedent's debts. The foundation, there-
fore, contracted with the wife to liquidate these debts and to pay her
$350 per. month for life, payments to commence after the $42,000 was
paid to her. The annuities to the wife were made a charge against
all of the assets of the foundation. The Tax Court found that the wife
required the above contract as a condition for her taking under the will.
Between 1934 and 1943 the foundation had a total net income of
$135,564.59. By 1940 the wife had received $42,800 out of net in-
come, and in that year she began receiving her monthly payments of
$350. This amount was charged as a "general expense" on the founda-
tion's books."' The Trustees paid an income tax for the year 1940
and thereafter claimed an exempt status under Section 101 (6). The
Commissioner denied their claim and determined a deficiency in tax
for 1940. Apparently the trustees did not argue that income paid to
the wife was deductible under Sections 162(b) or (c), and that the
remaining income was deductible under Section 162(a)."2
The Tax Court (five judges dissenting) held the foundation
exempt under Section 101 (6) despite the Commissioner's argument
to the contrary based primarily on the grounds that the foundation
was operating a commercially profitable business (a point discussed
supra), and that part of its net income was being distributed to the
wife. On the second point the court held that the predominant purpose
of the foundation was to promote research in ceramics. The payments
to the wife were not the "real purpose for which the foundation was
founded," said the court. "They were a charge upon its entire assets
and had to be paid in order to free the assets and income for use in
111. For the years 1934-1943, in addition to the $42,000 distributed to the wife, the
foundation disbursed $37,021.51 to research fellowships and endowment, and the
remaining income ($56,537.08) was applied to the decedent's debts ($21,679.65), debts
of the business, and additions to plant and equipment. In addition, the wife received
$14,700 in monthly payments which was charged as a general expense against gross
income. The foundation also maintained a research staff at an annual expense of
$16,800. The staff "continues tests and gives advice . . . without charge . . . [to]
any person or company engaged in the [ceramics] business." 9 T.C. 533, 538 (1947).
112. Perhaps the trustees believed the trust would be classified as an association
anyway, or perhaps they feared that payments to the wife would not be deductible
under §§ 162(b) or (c). She was not strictly a trust beneficiary and she was re-
ceiving greater sums from the trust than the testator provided for. Furthermore,
there was precedent for holding an organization exempt under § 101 (6) even though
its income was subject to private annuities. See notes 114 et seq., infra.
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the scientific aims of the foundation." 113 The opinion of the Sixth
Circuit echoed the Tax Court's reasoning. Both opinions referred to
Lederer v. Stockton ... as a basic authority.
In the Stockton case a decedent bequeathed his residuary estate
to a hospital subject to certain private annuities. The state court re-
quired a private trustee to hold the estate until all of the annuitants
were dead. By 1913 only one annuitant receiving a small sum was
living and the trustee had "loaned" the trust property to the hospital
which paid him sufficient interest to pay the annuity and administration
expenses. The collector assessed a tax on the trust income for the
years 1913 through 1917, which the trustee paid under duress and
then sued to recover." 5 The Supreme Court upheld the lower court
judgments in favor of the trustee." 6
Although the necessary implication of the Stockton decision is
that income received by a charitable institution and charged with a
private annuity is non-taxable and the receipt of such income does not
destroy the institution's exemption, the opinion does not discuss the
problem." 7 The court instead seemed intent on demonstrating that
the income in substance belonged to the hospital rather than the private
trust, which perhaps could not deduct payments of income to a charity
under the 1916 Act, and if it could, the deduction would be subject
to a 15 per cent limitation.""
Decisions subsequent to the Stockton case have consistently ap-
plied a liberal construction to the charitable exemption and deduction
sections in private annuity cases."' If income of the organization is
113. 9 T.C. 533, 541 (1947).
114. 260 U.S. 3 (1922). The opinions refer also to Emerit E. Baker, Inc., 40
B.T.A. 555 (1939), where the decedent created a foundation during his life to which
he devised his residuary estate which included all of the stock in a manufacturing con-
cern. The bequest was subject to annuities to his wife and for the education of rela-
tives. From 1929 (when decedent died) to 1937 payments to charities from corpus
and income were from four to twelve times the total annuities. The wife's annuity
,f $19,200 slightly exceeded income for the first three years and thereafter was about
one-third of income. The foundation was held exempt on the basis of Lederer v.
Stockton, sutpra note 114. See also Commissioner v. Citizens & Southern National
Bank, 147 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1945).
115. Only the years 1916 and 1917 were at issue before the Supreme Court. See
First Trust & Savings Bank v. Smietanka, 257 U.S. 602 (1922) which held that a
trust estate was not a taxable entity under the 1913 Act.
116. The trustee (Stockton) obtained a judgment in the district court and the
circuit court affirmed, 266 Fed. 676 (3d Cir. 1920).
117. Section 11(a), 1916 Act, 39 STAT. 756, defining exempt charitable organiza-
tions contained the same limitation against distributing net income to private persons
as that found in the present Code.
118. Section 5, Revenue Act of 1916, as amended by § 1201, War Income Tax
Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 331. See 6 MEaTxs, THE LAv OF FFDERAL INcomE TAXATION
§ 36.69, note 17 (1949). There was even some question under this early statute
whether income regularly payable to private beneficiaries was taxable to the trust.
Apparently it was not. A.R.R. 684, 5 Cum. BuLL. 184 (1921) ; Sol. Op. 146, 1-2 Cum.
BuLL. 160 (1922); Albert J. Appell, 10 B.T.A. 1225 (1928).
119. Compare Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934) ; Estate of J. B. White-
head, 3 T.C. 40 (1944), aff'd sub twrn. Commissioner v. Citizens & Southern Na-
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used "primarily" for charitable purposes and the payment of private
annuities is only "incidental" to its main activities, exemption will be
granted. But if the private diversion of net income becomes so large
that it is apparent that the organization "was created for private
as well as public purposes," exemption is denied.'2 The question of
when the private diversion of income becomes too large is a difficult
one to resolve. At least it can be said that if private individuals are
receiving approximately one-half of the net income, or more, the
exemption is destroyed. 2' It is worthy of note, however, that in two
of the cases permitting the payment of private annuities there was the
added factor of pacifying the wife who might otherwise destroy the
foundation by insisting on her statutory share.' 2
Although the cases permitting charitable organizations to pay
private annuities and retain their exemption are contrary to the statute,
failure to assert liability may be justified if the annuity is small and
the organization could not otherwise realize the bequest. Of course
it places the trusfees of the organization in the position of acting as
trustees for private beneficiaries with added responsibilities which they
might not wish to assume. 23  The designation of a private trustee
to administer the trust during the lives of the private income bene-
ficiaries need not make the income, estate or gift tax consequences
any more onerous than are the tax liabilities under the present inter-
tional Bank, 147 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1945); St Louis Union Trust Co. v. Burnet, 59
F.2d 922 (8th Cir. 1932); Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Eaton, 20 F.2d 419
(D. Conn. 1927) ; 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 12.04 (1942) ; 6
MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION § 34.02 (1949) ; Hartung, Estate
Tax Deductions for Gifts to Charity-The Certainty Requirement, 13 GEO. WASH.
LAW REv. 198 (1944).
120. The Davenport Foundation, P-H 1947 TC MEm. DEc. f 47,341, aff'd per
cur., 170 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1948); Scholarship Endowment Foundation v. Nicholas,
25 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1938), aff'd, 106 F.2d 552 (10th Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 623 (1939); Roger L. Putnam, 6 T.C. 702 (1946). In the last case tax-
payer was claiming a deduction under § 23(o) for a gift to a trust established by his
uncle.
121. In Roger L. Putnam, supra note 120, the private annuitant received one-half
of the trust's net income. In The Davenport Foundation, supra note 116, the private
individuals were receiving slightly less than one-half of the net income. The creator
of the Scholarship Endowment Foundation was entitled to an annuity amounting to
substantially all of the net income.
122. This was a factor stressed in Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramics Foundation,
supra note 105, and Emerit E. Baker, Inc., supra note 114. Cf. Estate of J. B.
Whitehead, 3 T.C. 40 (1944), aff'd sub norn. Commissioner v. Southern National
Bank, 147 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1945), involving private annuities and a settlement by
the executors with an estranged wife. The settlement was paid out of income of the
estate which otherwise would have gone to a charitable foundation. The estate
claimed that it had no taxable income under § 162 because all of its income was
distributed to the foundation or private annuitants. Both courts held that the settle-
ment out of income did not make the estate taxable under the alternative theories
that either the settlement was necessary to preserve the charity and was thus for a
charitable purpose, or that taxation is based on what the will requires the executor
to do with income, not what the executor actually does with it.
123. Cf. Lederer v. Stockton, 260 U.S. 3 (1922). Compare Derbyshire's Estate,
239 Pa. 389, 86 Ati. 878 (1913).
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pretation of the Code if a charitable organization manages the fund.
If all trust income is annually distributable to the private and charitable
beneficiaries within the limitations of Sections 162(a), (b) and (c),
the trust will not be subject to income tax. 2 ' In computing the estate
tax charitable deduction it would have to be reduced in any event by
the present value of the private annuitant's interest.2 5  And if either
the charitable or private trustee has power to invade corpus, an ade-
quate "standard" must be set forth in order that the extent of invasion
may be adequately calculable. 26
Thus under the Code, where the remainder and perhaps part of
the present income of a trust are payable to a charitable organization,
the tax consequences are the same whether a charitable organization
or a private trustee administers it even though the trust may be
subject to private annuities.'27 If the courts conclude that the founda-
tion device is being overworked by ingenious taxpayers, this factor
may be one reason for their adopting a narrower construction of the
Code where charitable organizations are paying private annuitants.
124. For discussions of the deductibility from trust net income of income "to
be distributed currently . . . to beneficiaries" (3 162(b)) or "income which, in the
discretion of the fiduciary, may be either distributed to the beneficiary or accumulated"
(§ 162(c)), see 6 MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 36.40 et seq.
(1949) ; KENNEDY, FEDEAL INcomE TAXATION OF TRuSTS AND ESTATES § 2.01 et seq.
(1948).
125. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, §§ 81.44, 81.10 (1942).
126. There are many cases discussing the problem of an adequate standard. Three
Supreme Court cases lead the way: Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151
(1929) ; Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 256 (1943) ;
and Henslee v. Union Planters' National Bank & Trust Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 290 (1949).
These decisions, particularly the last two, provide that the proper test is whether the
extent of invasion of corpus is accurately calculable, not the test of whether the
possibility of invasion is imminent or remote. The Tax Court and lower federal
courts have not relinquished using the second test, probably because it is much easier
to apply. See Union Planters' National Bank v. Henslee, 166 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.
1948), rev'd, 69 S. Ct. 290 (1949); Estate of Finley Kenny, 11 T.C. 104 (1948).
Compare National Bank of Commerce of San Antonio v. Scofield, 169 F.2d 145 (5th
Cir. 1948) ; DeCastro's Estate v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1946). The
cases are elaborately discussed in PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND G=FT TAXATION § 12.26
(Supp. 1946).
127. There may be an advantage in the trust form of charitable organization if
the creator wishes the organization to distribute part of its income to private indi-
viduals and devote the remaining income to charitable purposes. Under the wording
of § 162(a) a trust is permitted an unlimited charitable deduction for income paid
pursuant to trust terms to exempt charitable organizations and for income which
the trust devotes to its own charitable undertakings. Sections 162(b) and (c) also
permit the trust to deduct income paid to private beneficiaries. Thus a foundation in
the form of a trust need not fear taxation of its income even though part of it is
payable to private beneficiaries (barring its classification as an association. under
§ 3797(a) (3). However, such a trust would still run the risk of failing to qualify
as an exempt organization under §§ 23(o) and 1004(a) (2) and therefore gifts to
the trust or the gift creating the trust would not be qualified charitable deductions
under the income and gift taxes. Because of the language in which estate tax § 812(d)
defines exempt trusts an estate tax charitable deduction might perhaps be allowed,
but this is doubtful.
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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR THREE PROBLEMS
A survey of the tax status of foundations discloses at least three
major problems, problems which are not confined solely to foundations.
The first, and easiest of solution, is that presented by the inconsistent
language of the Code sections. The other problems require a recon-
sideration of fundamental objectives. Should legislation be enacted
to forbid foundations, or charitable organizations in general, from
operating commercial enterprises? What other legislation is neces-
sary to cope with foundations as tax avoidance devices? How broad
in scope should the legislation be?
Uniform Language in the "Charities" Sections.-If the Revenue
Revision Bill now pending before Congress is adopted, the difficulty
presented by the lack of uniform language in the various Code sections
will largely be overcome. 12  Unfortunately, the bill does not amend
Section 162(a). This section should contain requirements similar
to the other sections in order that charitable trusts are not given special
advantages. 12' A method of achieving this result would be to amend
Section 162(a) to provide that if more than a certain percentage (for
example, 15 per cent) of trust gross income is payable to charitable
beneficiaries, the trust must comply with the requirements for chari-
table organizations contained in Section 101 (6) 130 (except that trust
income may inure to private individuals).
The Operation of Commercial Enterprises.-The Treasury pro-
posed two amendments to the Code in 1942 which would go far
towards eliminating other tax advantages afforded by foundations. 3'
The first proposal was to tax the income of exempt organizations
derived from the operation of a commercial enterprise. The second
was to limit the estate tax charitable deduction to an undetermined
percentage of the gross estate similar to the limitation in Section 23
(o). The proposals are all-embracing in their scope. They do not
differentiate, for example, between charitable organizations operating
a business but controlled by the former owner of the business, and
charitable organizations controlled by alumni, faculty, or friends of a
college or university. Nor do they distinguish between bequests to a
family foundation and bequests to an independently established chari-
128. See note 22 supra.
129. See note 127 supra.
130. This amendment would eliminate specifically any possible advantage which
charitable trusts might obtain over charitable corporations in the operation of a
business.
131. Statement of Mr. Randolph Paul, as tax adviser to the Secretary of the
Treasury, Hearings on the Revenue Revision Act of 1942, H.R. 2708, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1180 (1942).
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table institution such as a college or religious organization. Such a
general treatment of the problem assumes that Congress intends to
limit the federal tax subsidy to both family controlled charitable or-
ganizations and those with a long recognized function and independent
status. The treasury proposal is still some distance, however, from
the viewpoint that all tax exemptions should be abolished and direct
government aid for worthy enterprises substituted.'32 Its position
was more or less that the government should share in certain activities
of exempt organizations and in every charitable donation of over a
certain amount.
The Treasury recommendations presented to the present Con-
gress by Secretary Snyder are not as comprehensive insofar as private
charitable foundations are concerned.183  Secretary Snyder proposed
that business undertakings by exempt institutions "which are clearly
unrelated to their primary functions be taxed at regular corpora-
tion income tax rates." Mr. Snyder's second recommendation re-
lating to charitable organizations was directed at eliminating the use
of the organization by the founder for the benefit of himself and his
family. His remarks seemed particularly pointed at the Textron situ-
ation. There a special Congressional investigation '35 showed that a
textile firm had created charitable trusts for the purposes of controlling
other businesses (in many cases former competitors) and as sources
of investment capital in the settlor's business. Little or no trust in-
come had ever been paid to the charitable beneficiaries. One way to
eliminate these abuses of tax exemption the Secretary suggested
"would be to require that such trusts or foundations pay out sub-
stantially all net income within a specified period after the close of
the taxable year. 6 A further requirement should be a prohibition
against dealings between the trust and its creator or businesses under
his control and against the use of the trust for the personal advantage
132. Killough, Exemptions to Educational, Philanthropic md Religious Organi-
zation, TAX EXEMPTIONs 23 et seq. (Tax Policy League, 1938) ; Stimson, The Exemp-
tion of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN L. REV. 411, 422
et seq. (1934).
133. Statement of Secretary Snyder before the Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, February 3, 1950. CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP. No. 9,
Part 1, p. 10 (February 8, 1950). Supplementary Treasury Department Statement
on Tax Exempt Organizations, February 7, 1950. CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP. No.
10, Part 1 (February 15, 1950).
134. Ibid.
135. Investigatim of Closing of Nashua, N.H. Mills and Operations of Textron,
In., SEN. REP. No. 101, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
136. See proposed legislation discussed in note 153 infra. But unlike the bills
discussed therein, the Treasury recommendation is limited to foundations which are
"privately controlled and which are not supported by the general public." Supple-
mentary Treasury Department Statement, supra note 133, at 3.
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of the grantor," or his family or associates.137 Although Mr. Snyder
proposed far reaching changes to the estate and gift taxes 138 the 1942
recommendation for a percentage limitation on estate and gift tax
charitable deductions was not renewed.
The problem presented by charitable organizations operating com-
mercial enterprises needs legislative treatment. The remedy should
not be left to the uncertainty of judicial decisions with the consequent
confusion caused by their retroactive effect and uncertainty of appli-
cation to other types of investment now open to exempt organizations.
Presumably the amendment would deal only with the problem of in-
come derived from the operation of a business and would not apply to
income from securities, leases or mortgages held by the institution.
The Treasury's present recommendations for legislation so indicate,
although it proposes that rental income received by an exempt insti-
tution under a sale and lease-back transaction be subject to the cor-
porate income tax. A clear line of demarcation must be drawn be-
tween these different sources of income.1 89
Should the legislation distinguish between organizations con-
trolled by the former owner of the business and those controlled by
alumni or friends of an exempt institution? The answer depends
upon what practice Congress is attempting to eliminate. If Congress
wishes to eliminate advantages obtained by an individual in selling
his business to a foundation which he thereafter controls, then an
all-inclusive proposal such as the Treasury's is too broad. But if Con-
gress is seeking to put an end to the competitive advantages derived
by a charitable corporation over its non-charitable rival, then whatever
the proposal, it must have a general application. 4  Insofar as competi-
tive advantages are concerned, there would seem to be little difference
between a charitable corporation controlled by the former owner of the
business, the net income of which must go to a college, and a similar
charitable corporation controlled by alumni. Both corporations would
137. See note 133 supra, Statement by Secretary Snyder at 10, and Supplementary
Treasury Statement at 3.
138. See statements by Secretary Snyder on Estate and Gift Taxes before the
Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, February 3, 1950. CCH
FED. EST. & GFrT TAx REP. No. 28, Part 1 (February 9, 1950).
139. Congress may find it difficult to define 'what are "businesses which are
clearly unrelated to [the] primary functions" of non-profit organizations. The Sup-
plementary Treasury Department Statement, supra note 133, at 2, states that a uni-
versity bookstore may continue to sell books to students, an agricultural college
may run a wheat farm in connection with its educational program, and a social club
may sell food to its members, without affecting tax exemption status.
140. The contention that a business operated by an exempt organization has a
potential competitive advantage over rival private firms seems the principal argu-
ment at present by those advocating that the income of such businesses be taxed.
For a resume of various considerations see Finkelstein, Freedom From Uncertainty in
Income Tax Exemptions, 48 MicH. L. REv. 449, 459 et seq. (1950). See cases cited
note 132 supra.
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have the advantage of escaping federal taxes and thus being able to
accumulate reserves or to cut prices when their competitors could
not.
141
It has been suggested that instead of taxing the income of an
exempt organization operating a business, the Code be amended to
provide that such part of the organization's annual income as would
be taxable if it were privately owned be distributed to charity or to the
exempt organization which it supports." The proposal could also
be applied to rental income which an exempt organization receives
under a sale and lease-back transaction. The non-profit institution is
favored in this situation over private investors since a larger part of
its rental income can be applied to repayment of borrowed funds.'43
If this proposal were applied from the time when the charitable cor-
poration acquired the business or entered into the sale and lease-back
transaction, it would eliminate the advantage which the charitable or-
ganization has over competitors. Such a solution, however, might
make the purchase of a business by an alumni group so much more
difficult that this method of investment by a college would be dis-
couraged.'4
The proposal would seem to take away any tax advantage from
selling to a family foundation. The original owner might as well sell
to a non-charitable corporation owned by the family. He will not get
the purchase price any sooner; and the family will receive the cor-
poration's net income after the original owner has been paid. The
individual taxpayer would receive only the advantage ordinarily de-
rived from a charitable donation.
If this analysis is correct, the issue left for Congress on this part
of the charities problem is whether to allow colleges and other exempt
institutions this new and more promising source of investment. With
the competitive advantages gone, the greatest impetus towards an
over-concentration of wealth in the hands of charitable corporations
would disappear. However, the rate of return on this type of invest-
ment may be extraordinarily high, especially under present economic
141. The college might conceivably benefit by a more liberal policy in distributing
net income from an alumni-controlled corporation. On the other hand, a corporation
controlled by its former owner might be operated more efficiently and'at a greater
profit.
142. See testimony of Mr. John Gerdes, Hearings on Proposed Revision of the
Internal Revetue Code, H.R. 80th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 5, 3527 (1947-48). For pro-
posed legislation pointing towards this result see note 153 infra.
143. See generally Cary, Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Lease-Back
of Property: Biness, Tax and Policy Considerations, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1948) ;
BLODGETT, TAXATION OF BUSINESS CONDUCTED BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS,
N.Y.U. FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 418 (1946).
144. See the testimony of Mr. Gerdes, supra note 142 at 3539, indicating the great
advantage that tax exempt income has been to an alumni-controlled corporation pur-
chasing a business. See also Cary, note 143 supra at 28.
648 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
conditions. This factor alone might prove such an inducement for
exempt institutions to purchase businesses that an over-concentration
of wealth and endangering of federal revenue would result, forcing Con-
gress to tax this source of income.
145
The Percentage Limitation.-The second of the Treasury's
1942 proposals, the percentage limitation, suggests what appears to
be a simple solution to most of the other tax and social problems cre-
ated by the foundation. 4 The limitation would be fairly easy to en-
act as legislation ' 47 and to administer. This method of governmental
control of charitable bequests and devises is not new. Some states,
but for a different policy reason, that of protecting the surviving
family, limit the percentage of a decedent's estate that can be left
to charitable organizations. 4 8 A consideration of the Treasury's pro-
posal requires, again, a clarification of policy. The amendment would
place a limitation upon the creation of all fotindations as well as a
145. Many state property tax statutes afford charitable exemption on the basis
of the use of the property rather than on owmnership. Under a use statute most
courts require direct physical use of the exempt property by the charitable organi-
zation, thereby precluding exemption to property which the organization leases for
commercial purposes, even though the income from the property is devoted to chari-
table activities. On the other hand, under an ownership statute the courts generally
exempt all property owned by an exempt organization regardless of use. Stimson,
The Exemption of Property front Taxation in the United States 18 MINN. L. REv.
411, 420-421 (1934) ; Comment 1 WE ST. RES. L. REV. 151 (1949). Mr. Gerdes testi-
fied that the New York University alumni-owned piston ring factory in St. Louis
pays local and state taxes on the ground that the University does not "directly benefit"
St. Louis. Note 142 supra at 3531, 3532.
146. The legislative history does not tell why Congress did not place a per-
centage limitation upon the estate tax deduction. The 1916 Act did not have any
charitable deduction. It was first provided for in § 403(a)(3) of the Revenue Act
of 1918 "almost by accident." See GarswoLD, CASES AND MATRIALS Oi FEDERAL
TAXATION 285 (1946), for a review of the legislative history. The income tax chari-
table deduction limited to 15 per cent of net income first appeared in § 1201, War
Income Tax Act of 1917. The failure to provide a limitation in the estate tax deduc-
tion is all the more strange in view of the investigation and criticism of large founda-
tions by the United States Commission on Industrial Relations. See 1 UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT AND TESTIMONY, SEN. Doc.
415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-85, 220 (1915-16). 8 id. 7430 (testimony of Samuel
Untermeyer); 8 id. 7647 (Samuel Gompers) ; 8 id. 7663 (Louis D. Brandeis) ; 8 id.
7850 et seq. John D. Rockefeller, Jr,). Representative Jerry Voorhis proposed in
1942 that testamentary gifts to "educational and charitable trusts" be limited to twenty-
five per cent "of the estate." Hearings on the Revenute Revision. Act of 1942, H.R.
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 888 (1942).
147. A corresponding amendment will have to be added to the gift tax which
will not be as simple to enact. It would appear impractical to estimate a taxpayer's
total wealth at any one time in his life and limit his total deductible charitable gifts
to a certain percentage of that total. Perhaps the amendment would take the form
of a certain percentage of the taxpayer's annual income as is done under § 23(o).
Another possibility is a deduction in the nature of a definite amount which could
be given tax free annually or in one person's lifetime. The gift tax annual exclusion,
and its specific exemption are models. Sections 1003(b) ; 1004(a) (1).
148. See ATxINsoN, WILLs 106 et seq. (1937) ; 1 PAGE, WILLS 85 et seq. (1941).
States that have limitations in regard to the proportion of the estate which may be
devoted to charity frequently also stipulate that testamentary gifts are invalid unless
the will is executed a specified time before the testator's death. Generally only close,
surviving relatives can object to invalid gifts. Atkinson lists only ten jurisdictions
which restrict charitable testamentary gifts in any manner.
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limitation upon a source of revenue to other private charitable insti-
tutions, universities and colleges, for example, which are now in diffi-
cult financial positions. The issue is thus renewed of whether to at-
tack the problem by such an all-inclusive amendment or by legisla-
tion directed specifically at foundations in general, or as sources of
family control of tax exempt wealth.
Statistical studies indicate that decedents do not avail themselves
of the estate tax charitable deduction to any considerable extent.
Charitable bequests are estimated to average six per cent of the gross
estate of those leaving estates large enough to require the filing of a
return under the federal estate tax.-49 This would seem to demon-
strate that a percentage limitation would be an easily applied remedy
aimed directly at limiting large bequests to family foundations. The
statistics, however, are not derived from comprehensive individual case
studies listing the recipients of donations.'5" They do not purport
to deny the obvious fact, for example, that occasionally large dona-
tions are made,to independent exempt institutions. It has been esti-
mated that during the period from 1920 to 1940 "private benefactions"
to institutions of higher education varied from sixteen to forty-three
per cent of educational and general income.' 5 ' A general percentage
limitation might seriously eliminate an important source of college
revenue, whereas the failure to provide a percentage limitation has
not been an important revenue loss to the government.
52
In addition to the general policy considerations that must be de-
cided before the enactment of a general percentage limitation, there
are separate considerations in determining appropriate legislation deal-
ing specifically with foundations. Foundations are in many instances
being used as means of personal tax avoidance, while at the same time,
whether family controlled or not, they are doing a great variety of
important philanthropic work. These factors raise two problems: (1)
whether the Code is too liberal in permitting family control of founda-
tions; (2) whether foundations in general are doing work of sufficient
149. Statements by Secretary Snyder on Estate and Gift Taxes before the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, February 3, 1950, Exhibit 5,
Part IV(b), CCH FED. ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REP. No. 28, Part 1 (February 9,
1950) 17. GOLDTHORPE, HIGHER EDUCATION, PHILANTHROPY, AND FEDERAL TAX Ex-
EmPTIONS 15 (American Council on Education Studies, Series 5, No. 7, 1944);
JONES, THE YEARBOOK OF PHILANTHROPY, 1942-43, 24 (1943) ; Harriss, Philanthropy
and Federal Tax Exemption, 47 J. OF POLIT. ECON. 526; LINDEMAN, WEALTH AND
CULTURE 47 (1936).
150. The studies is the above note, except for Lindeman's, are based on the
Treasury's compilations reported in the Statistics of Income. For a critique of this
source see HAmuss, supra note 149. Lindeman investigated samplings of probate
court records in New York City for alternative years from 1927 to 1933.
151. GOLDTHORPE, op. cit. supra note 149 at 3 et seq.
152. See especially, HARnIss, supra note 149 at 540.
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public importance in improving the public welfare to justify their tax
exemption.
In answer to the first problem, it is obvious that the Code pro-
vides almost no limitations against family control of foundations. The
board of trustees and officers of the foundation may be staffed by the
founder, his family and associates; they may receive compensation,
and private individuals may receive annuities, from the foundation's
income; the board may be self-perpetuating; they may accumulate in-
come for an indeterminate number of years; ... and the principal fund
may be kept intact in perpetuity. The second of the Treasury's 1950
proposals would provide a considerable limitation on family control.
The private foundation would generally be required to distribute sub-
stantially all net income within a specified period after the close of the
taxable year. And the foundation would be prohibited from making
loans to the founder or officers or their families; from paying unrea-
sonable salaries; or from making substantial purchases -of securities
or other property from such persons. Moreover, the founder or his
family would be prohibited from using the foundation to continue con-
trol of an existing business. These acivities would be "prohibited"
by providing that contributions to foundations permitting such prac-
tices would not be allowed as charitable deductions for income, estate,
and gift tax purposes." 4
In regard to the second problem, the activities of foundations,
no general knowledge is publicly available. The Treasury Department
153. The common law rule restricting accumulations of income to the period de-
termined by the rule against perpetuities is not applicable to charitable trusts. But
the court will invalidate a provision for accumulation in a charitable trust if the
period for accumulation is on the facts and circumstances unreasonable. RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY § 442, comment a. The section indicates that the rule is also ap-
plicable if the trustee is given a discretionary power to accumulate or expend income
for charitable purposes. Three bills introduced in the first session of the 81st Con-
gress strike at this problem of accumulating income. Similar bills introduced by
Senator Tobey (SEN. REP. 1408, March 25, 1949) and by Representative Lane
(H.R. REP. 3898, March 30, 1949) would amend § 162(a) to limit its deduction to a
trust which paid its beneficiaries during the taxable year 85 per cent of the trust
gross income. The bills, which are aimed at the Textron situation (see notes 1 and
135 mtpra), also provide that trusts which invest funds in manufacturing concerns
must register with the Secretary of Commerce, submit to audits and file annual
reports. The bill introducdd by Representative Kean (H.R. REP. 2976, February 24,
1949) would require organizations exempt under § 101(6) to distribute 75 per cent
of their yearly income, excluding capital gains added to principal, unless their plan to
accumulate more than 25 per cent of their income was approved by the Commissioner,
and a trust would be allowed a deduction under § 162(a) for any part of its gross
income (exclusive of capital gains added to principal) which was paid for charitable
purposes or permanently set aside under a plan approved by the Commissioner.
154. These proposals are made in the Supplementary Treasury Department State-
ment, note 133 supra at 3. The Statement does not spell out specific legislation. It
does state, however, that the foundation should be allowed to retain a reserve for
contingencies or to meet a long term commitment to furnish funds for research or
similar projects. The Clifford Regulations contain some limitations upon transactions
between the grantor or his family and a charitable trust but the limitations are
fairly narrow in scope. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a) -21(e), and text at note
67 mupra.
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has amassed the greatest amount of information on the subject, infor-
mation, of course, not open to public inspection. Since 1921 the
regulations have required an organization to file a claim for an exemp-
tion, ' and since 1941 foundations and many other types of exempt
institutions have had to file annual information returns.'56 Staffs
in the Treasury and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue are
now using these returns to prepare reports on a number of exempt
institutions, including foundations. 57 The reports will undoubtedly
be made public. They should supply a considerable amount
of information on foundation activity. The returns are not of sufficient
breadth, however, to provide the basis for a complete picture.
Charitable foundations file their returns on Form 990. Among
other items it calls for a fairly detailed statement of the foundation's
sources of income (including business activity) and its disposition of
income. Expenses and compensation paid must be listed, as well as
contributions and the names of donees. If the organization's gross
income exceeds $25,000, balance sheets for the beginning and ending
of the year must be attached. When the organization holds more than
ten per cent of any class of stock in a corporation, the name of the
corporation and a description of the stock must be given.
As a minimum of adequate reporting, the form should be amended
to include the following information: The names, relationship, and
business association with the founder of all trustees, officers, and mem-
bers of any committee controlling the investment of assets and distri-
bution of income. The compensation of such individuals should be
separately listed. The foundation's assets and all major changes dur-
ing the year should be described. The returns should be kept by the
Bureau in files subject to public inspection. 158
Most of the above changes in Form 990 could be made without
amending Section 54(f), but the Code would have to be amended to
provide for public inspection of returns.5 9 At present, although a
charitable trust claiming a total or partial charitable deduction under
Section 162(a) must file a fiduciary's return, the trust does not have
to file under Section 54(f) since this applies only to organizations
155. See Art. 311, U.S. Treas. Reg. 62 (1921) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.101-2.
156. Returns were first required by regulation for the years 1941 and 1942 from
all exempt organizations except religious organizations. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 103,
§ 19.101, as amended by T.D. 5152 (1942). From 1943 and subsequent years returns
have been required by statute. Section 54(f), added by § 117, Revenue Act of 1943.
Congress enlarged the number of institutions excepted from the requirement of filing
annual returns.
157. See note 1 .rpra.
158. The suggested amendments must also apply to Form 1023, the form upon
which a charitable organization files its original claim for exemption under U.S.
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.101-2.
159. The bill introduced by Representative Kean, note 153 iuipra, also provides
for public inspection by adding a subsection (d) to § 55.
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exempt under Section 101. To achieve uniform reporting, a trust
which distributes more than a certain percentage of its gross income
(for example, 15 per cent) to charitable purposes should also be re-
quired to file a return under Section 54(f). Whatever other legis-
lation is finally adopted, a comprehensive sytem of public reporting
is a requisite. Congress and federal agencies in various fields would
benefit from more complete information. Such knowledge would also
be of benefit to the foundations themselves and to various units of local
and state government in order that a better coordinated program of
philanthropic activity may be carried on.'
Private attempts to survey the field have been far from com-
plete. ' 1 Most of the foundations do not publish annual reports, and
among this group are some of the largest. Many of the foundations
refuse to answer any questionnaires sent by private investigators, even
if they are from fellow foundations.'62 From the information gathered,
however, the surveys agree that the most substantial fields of founda-
tion interest are education, medicine, and social welfare.' In these
three fields, foundations have made their most significant contribu-
tions in medicine "' and higher education. 5  Their activities in the
social welfare field have been typified as largely palliative in character,
a charge often levelled at foundation activities in general.' 6 Probably
this difficulty can never be adequately dealt with until those who
control foundations cease to be drawn largely from the most conserva-
tive strata in our society.
67
Certainly the Code needs strengthening against family control of
foundations. Such use of the charitable deductions and exemptions is
contrary to the fundamental policy of our federal tax system. The re-
160. State attorneys general charged with the duty of enforcing charitable trusts
and corporations would be greatly aided. See Reports and Reconnmendations for
Legislation of Former Attorney General Bushnell; Charitable Trutsts, 30 MAss L.Q.
22 (1945).
161. Recent general surveys are: HARRISON AND ANDREws, AMERICAN FOUNDA-
TIoNS FOR SocIAL WELFARE (1946); RAYMOND RicH AssOCIrATEs, AMERICAN FOuNDA-
TIONS AND THEIR FIELDS (1942); JONES, THE YEARBOOK OF PHILANTHROPY, 1942-43;
LINDEMAN, WEALTH AND CULTURE (1936). Lindeman's is the only independent critical
study. The others, while giving valuable information, are written by foundation
administrators or those closely connected with foundations.
162. Id. HARRISON AND ANDREWS at 5; LINDEMAN at 6.
163. Id. HARRISON AND ANDREWS at 79; LINDEMAN at 19; RAYMOND RIcH Asso-
CIATEs at 36.
164. LINDEMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 29. See also Flexner, Private Fortunes
and the Public Future, 156 Atlantic Monthly 215 (1935).
165. HoLLIS, PHILANTHROPIC FOUNDATIONS AND HIGHER EDUCATION (1938).
166. LINDEMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 30, 58; HARRISON AND ANDREws, op. cit.
.rupra note 5, at 97; Embree, Timed Billions. Are the Foundations Doing Their Job?
198 Harpers Mag. 28 (1949).
167. LINDEMAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 32, et seq., gives a summary of the back-
ground, occupations, and affiliations of the trustees of the 100 foundations and com-
munity trusts that he studied.
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cent Treasury proposals in this direction should be carefully considered.
They have the merit of attacking problems which the present evidence
demonstrates should be corrected. A percentage limifation on chari-
table donations to foundations in general would also tend to discourage
independent foundations as distinguished from other exempt institu-
tions, a policy which is certainly not justified on the present evidence.
Both of these solutions necessitate some difficult problems of defining
prohibited activities of the specific type of foundation that is to be
non-exempt. These difficult questions of definition would not be
present in a general percentage limitation, but such legislation might
seriously encroach upon the financing of some exempt institutions
which should be encouraged.
